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—ject, therefore, is within the Concept, and this is the unity of self-consciousness into which it has been received. Its objectivity, or the Concept itself, is therefore nothing other than the nature of self-consciousness; it has no other moments moments (Momente): in Hegel’s philosophy, these are not units of time, but essential constituent elements or "phases" that make up a logical whole. or determinations than the "I" itself.
Accordingly, a primary principle of Kantian philosophy justifies the fact that, in order to recognize what the Concept is, we are reminded of the nature of the "I." Conversely, however, it is necessary to have grasped the concept of the "I" as it was stated previously. If one stops at the mere representation representation (Vorstellung): the mental "picture" or "image" we have of things in our ordinary, everyday thinking before we analyze them logically. of the "I" as it exists in our ordinary consciousness, then the "I" is merely a simple thing—also called the soul—in which the Concept resides as a possession or property. This representation, which does not delve into the nature of either the "I" or the Concept, cannot help to make the understanding of the Concept easier or more accessible.
The aforementioned Kantian account contains two further aspects concerning the Concept that require additional remarks. First, the stages of the understanding are preceded by the stages of feeling and intuition intuition (Anschauung): the direct, sensory perception of something (like seeing a color or feeling heat) before the mind begins to think about it.. It is an essential principle of Kantian transcendental philosophy that "concepts without intuition are empty," original: "dass die Begriffe ohne Anschauung leer sind." This is a famous quote from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, arguing that thinking needs sensory data to have any content. and they possess validity only as relations to the manifold original: "Mannichfaltigen." This refers to the raw, unorganized "variety" of sensory inputs (sights, sounds, smells) that the mind must organize. provided by intuition. Secondly, the Concept has been defined as the objective element of knowledge, and thus as truth. But on the other hand, the Concept is also treated as something merely subjective, from which reality—under which, since it...