The Householder's Dharma (Ratnakaranda-Sravakachara)

instance, the brain. This will be seen by a little reflexion. In order that the indivisible idea of, say, truth, be the result of the activity of this extended substance, either different parts of the idea must belong to different parts of the brain, or each part of the brain must be subject of an entire idea, or the whole idea must pertain to a single part of the brain. Now, the first alternative is absurd. The act by which the intellect apprehends truth, being, and the like, is an indivisible thought. It is directly incompatible with its nature to be allotted or distributed over an aggregate of separate atoms. But the second alternative is equally impossible. If different parts of the composite substance were each the basis of a complete idea, we should have at the same time not one, but several ideas of the object. Our consciousness, however, tells us this is not the case. Lastly, if the whole idea were located in one part or element of the composite substance, either this part is itself composite or simple. If the latter, then our thesis—that the ultimate subject of thought is indivisible—is established at once. If the former, then the old series of impossible alternatives will recur again until we are finally forced to the same conclusion."

The same argument also proves the simplicity of the subject of judgment. Maher, S. J., again points out:

"The simplest judgment pre-supposes the comparison of two distinct ideas, which must be simultaneously apprehended by one indivisible agent. Suppose the judgment, 'Science is useful,' to be elicited. If the subject which apprehends the two concepts 'science' and 'useful' is not indivisible, then we must assume that one of these terms is apprehended by one part and the other by a second: or else that separate elements of the divisible subject are each the seat of both ideas. In the former case, however, we cannot have any judgment at all. The part a apprehends 'science,' the different part b