The Householder's Dharma (Ratnakaranda-Sravakachara)

conceives the notion ‘useful,’ but the indivisible act of comparison requiring a single agent who combines the two ideas is wanting, and we can no more have the affirmative predication than if one man thinks ‘science,’ and another forms the concept ‘useful.’ In the second alternative, if a and b each simultaneously apprehended both ‘science’ and ‘useful,’ then we should have not one, but a multiplicity of judgments. The simplicity of the inferential act of the mind by which we seize the logical sequence of a conclusion is still more irreconcilable with the hypothesis of a composite substance. The three judgments—every y is z: every x is y; therefore every x is z—could no more constitute a syllogism if they proceeded from a composite substance than if each proposition was apprehended by a separate man.”

The phenomena of memory and intellection cannot, indeed, be explained on the materialistic hypothesis by saying that as the liver secretes the bile so does the gray matter of the brain secrete consciousness. Assuming that consciousness, thus secreted by the brain, arises, like light, from the friction of material particles, or otherwise, it would only go to illumine the scene. It could not, at the same time, create the spectator whose presence is necessary in order that the scene be seen, and personal relations understood and adjusted. The same difficulty has materialistic mechanism to face in respect of feelings and impulses. Let your machine be as delicate as you please, let its parts be as well-balanced and finely poised as you like; let it be capable of registering and recording the faintest movements—let all this be granted, yet is