316 e

COMP. But I am willing, Socrates, to answer whatever you wish.

SOC. Come then, do you believe that just things are unjust and unjust things are just, or that just things are just and unjust things are unjust?
COMP. I believe that just things are just, and unjust things are unjust.
SOC. Is this not also held to be so among all people as it is here?
COMP. Yes.
SOC. And so it is among the Persians?
COMP. Yes, also among the Persians.
SOC. And it is always so, presumably?
COMP. Always.
SOC. Are things that pull more weight considered heavier here, and those that pull less considered lighter, or the opposite?
316

COMP. No, but things that pull more weight are considered heavier, and those that pull less are considered lighter.
SOC. And is this so in Carthage and in Lykaia?
COMP. Yes.
SOC. Things that are beautiful, as it seems, are considered beautiful everywhere, and shameful things shameful, but not shameful things beautiful nor beautiful things shameful.
COMP. That is so.
SOC. Therefore, to speak generally, it is held that what is, is—not what is not—both among us and among all other people.
COMP. That is my opinion.
SOC. Whoever then misses what is, misses what is lawful.
COMP. So it is, Socrates, as you say, and these things appear lawful to us always and to others. But when I consider that we never cease shifting laws up and down, I cannot be persuaded.
SOC. Perhaps it is because you do not realize that these shifting things are the same. But observe them with me this way. Have you ever encountered a text regarding the health of the sick?
COMP. I have.
SOC. Do you know, then, to which art this text belongs?