Proclus, Theologia Platonica; Michael Psellos

It must be understood according to Plato what the origin of theology is, and what the conflict is among which men, and according to what power of the soul, in the aforementioned course:

So that, foreknowing these things, we may more easily grasp the starting-points of the demonstrations for what follows; all those, then, who have ever handed down theology to us, naming the first things and those that are gods by nature as "gods," say that theological science is concerned with these things. And some, having deemed only the bodily hypostasis worthy of being, have cast aside all talk of incorporeal things as nonsense to a secondary status; they declare the principles of beings to be certain bodies, and the power that knows these to be the sense-perception. Others, having suspended all bodies from incorporeal things and defining the primary essence in the soul and the psychic powers, call, I believe, the best of souls "gods"; and they name the science that ascends as far as these and knows them "theology."

But those who have suspended even the multitudes of souls from a more ancient principle and posit Intellect as the leader of the whole, say that the best end is the union of the soul with the Intellect; and they believe that the heaven, being illumined by life, differs from all other things. They have not yet called this truly "theology," but rather the explanation concerning the intellectual essence. All men, then, who concern themselves with the primary principles of beings and the causes themselves, call these "gods," and "theology" the science of these. But only the guidance of Plato concerning the gods refers all bodies back to the Intelligible as their principle, for indeed the greatest whole and the immortal—being thus wholly good—is naturally suited to preserve itself; but even its being, its living, and its undergoing change it possesses through the soul and the motions within it.

And he demonstrates that the psychic essence is more ancient than bodies, but suspended from the intellectual hypostasis; since everything that leads according to time—even if it be moved within itself—is more authoritative than those things born later, but secondary to the unmoved source. He declares [the soul] to be truly a principle and cause more honorable than bodies; and around that [intellect], all things both exist—as if he were the source of being—and have life through him, and [he declares] that the soul is what it is because of him. And before all, there exists