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A reply to the opinion held by many concerning the collection of Platonic theory as being partial and dishonoring all parts subject to dispute.
...setting down the first principles common to them; and perhaps someone might meet us, even while we are troubled by these things, [arguing] that the Platonic theology does not manifest itself correctly in all places. For some things they gather from other sources, and some from the texts themselves through arguments, attempting to present them as Plato’s own thoughts while constraining him by certain notions. For we set out to derive everything from that source. Thus it happens that we deem it right to refer the good doctrines to these very treatises of Plato; but those concerning the gods are by no means a primary teaching; nor should any place be assigned to that which proceeds through the entirety of the gods' goods, together with their mutual arrangement. For indeed we seem like those who construct the whole from the parts for the sake of utility, as if from a wholeness prior to the parts; and their entire sacred system is not cheering; for neither is it possible to lead the primary causes to the same point of its [the system's] becoming. Nor will he teach the contemplation concerning the intelligible genera as sovereign principles.
But the Phaedrus will preserve and reveal through a single work the first intellectual orders; and you will arrange the entire order of the gods according to their generative powers and the plenitude of sources, beginning from the first generation; and in general, everything comes into being from the one principle of all things, and the procession of the divine orders has occurred through the multitude of the encosmic gods. And how does a plenitude consist partly of things proper to nature and the universe as we know them, and partly of the offspring of the gods and those things pertaining to the connatural and indivisible subsistence of the wholes, which we do not claim? And what things equal to a monad would those who say these things assert regarding the science of divine matters so celebrated among us? For it is indeed absurd to call these doctrines, gathered from everywhere, "Platonic" based on foreign names, as they say, even if they have been referred to the goal of Plato’s philosophy. Unless, in general, there is no cause concerning the gods among us; and we might perhaps be left with the fact that even the accusers of Plato hold a contemptible opinion.