Bodleian Library MS. Barocci 131

But also within the opinions of animals, original: "doxais" — refers to the mental judgments or appearances formed by living creatures for it is not enough [to look] only [at internal states], but it also becomes self-moving from the outside toward necessary deeds. For that which possesses free-will and self-activity is self-moving. And the soul is self-moving; therefore, the soul is not motionless. Furthermore, we learn the teachings of Plato regarding the self-moving soul. Plato famously defined the soul in the Phaedrus as "that which moves itself." If indeed all bodies in the world move according to nature, there are three vital [faculties]: some are sensory, and some are rational. And regarding the sensory ones, for the powers of the soul are sensory. Since both souls and bodies are sensory, imagination phantasia: the faculty by which an image or "phantom" is presented to the mind subsequently arises in us through the senses.

And the movements existing in the soul are: vital, respiratory, and pulsative. The natural [faculties] are, for example, reproductive, nutritive, and augmentative. And the [faculties] of the soul are also appetitive, volitional, deliberative, and practical. If indeed in all these things opinion distinguishes the same souls. Since [this occurs] with sensation, for these [faculties] produced many other imaginations. For imagination is different from both opinion and thought. If indeed not every imagined thing yet has a judgment.

What, then, is imagination? Imagination is a movement produced by sense-perception according to activity. This is a direct citation of Aristotle’s definition in De Anima 429a. Since sight is the primary sense, the name [for imagination] is derived from light, original: "phaos" (light). Ancient etymology linked phantasia (imagination) to phos (light) because sight is impossible without it. because without light it is not possible to see. Because [images] remain and are similar to sensory perceptions, animals perform many actions according to them. The irrational [animals] do so because they do not possess intellect, such as wild beasts and insects. The rational [beings] do so because the intellect is sometimes veiled by passion or disease or sleep. Regarding imagination then—what it is and why it exists—it has been discussed.

Since the soul is defined by these two [factors]: by the critical power which is the work of intellect and sensation, and further by local motion. Regarding sensation and imagination, [the matter] has been determined. But regarding intellect, it must be addressed. For all intellect is either theoretical or practical. And every imagination is either rational or sensory. Irrational animals share in sensory imagination, but only rational [beings share] in rational deliberation. For sensory imagination, as it has been said, exists in the other animals as well, but deliberative [imagination exists] in the calculating [beings].

For whether one will do this or that is already the work of reason. And it is necessary to measure [choices] with a single standard, for one pursues the greater [good]. So that [the intellect] is able to make one [judgment] out of many images. The cause for [animals] not seeming to have opinion is that [they] do not have [the kind of opinion] from syllogism syllogismos: a logical argument where a conclusion is drawn from two premises. This [deliberation], however, contains that [imagination].

Therefore, appetite orexis: desire or drive does not possess the deliberative [faculty]. But it sometimes overcomes and moves the will. At other times, that [will] [moves] this [appetite], just as one sphere [moves] another sphere. A metaphor comparing the faculties of the soul to a series of interlocking celestial spheres. Appetite [moves the soul] when incontinence original: "akrasia" — acting against one's better judgment occurs. By nature, however, the higher [faculty] is more authoritative and moves [the others]. So that three movements are now set in motion. But the scientific [faculty] is not moved, but remains [constant].

Since universal supposition and reason [exist on one hand], and [supposition] of the particular [on the other]. For the one says that such a [person] must perform such a [deed]. But the other [says] that this [thing] is of such a [kind], and I am such a [person]. It is this opinion already that moves [us], not the universal one—or both, but the one [is] more at rest, while the other is not. Regarding the soul, then, what is sufficient for the present [has been stated]. Regarding local motion, it will be discussed in what follows. But regarding the soul's movement, power, and activity, and imagination, and intellect, it has been stated in the preceding [sections]. For whatever is said about it, you will find in the books On the Soul. Regarding local motion, which is according to nature for animals, it is necessary to proceed after these things concerning it.

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