METAPHYSICS

Chapter 1

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...we value it original: "gimus" (from "diligimus," meaning we love or value); this refers to the sense of sight mentioned on the preceding page. The cause is that this sense, more than any other, makes us know things and reveals many differences. ¶ Therefore, by nature, animals are born possessing sensation. However, from sensation, memory is not produced in some of them, while in others it is. For this reason, some are prudent, while others are more capable of learning than those who are unable to remember.
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¶ Indeed, those who cannot hear sounds—such as bees and any similar kind of animal—are prudent without the ability to learn Aristotle suggests that hearing is essential for being "taught" or "instructed," even if an animal shows practical intelligence or "prudence.". But those who possess this sense along with memory are able to learn.
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¶ Other animals, therefore, live by phantasms original: "phantasijs"; mental images or appearances and memories, and they participate
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only slightly in experience. ¶ But the human race lives also by art and reasonings. For humans, experience arises from memory; for many memories of the same thing create the power of a single
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experience. ¶ Therefore, experience seems to be something almost similar to science and art. Indeed, through experience, art and science are produced for men. For experience
Polus

(as Polus A student of Gorgias and a character in Plato's dialogues rightly says) produces art, while inexperience produces chance. Now, art comes into being when, from many experimental concepts, one universal opinion is formed concerning similar things. For instance, to have the opinion that this medicine helped Callias when he was suffering from this disease, and similarly Socrates, and many others individually, is a matter of experience. But to judge that it helped everyone categorized under one species A specific class or type who were suffering from this disease—such as the phlegmatic, or the choleric, or those suffering from a burning fever—this is the
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property of art. ¶ In regard to action, then, experience seems to differ not at all from art. On the contrary, we see that those with experience achieve what they intend more effectively than those who possess the theory original: "rationem"; the rational principle or reason without experience. The cause is that experience is the knowledge of particulars, whereas art is the knowledge of universals. Now, all actions and processes of generation are concerned with the particular. For the physician does not heal "Man," except incidentally; rather, he heals Callias, or Socrates, or someone else so named, who happens to be a man.

...we value referring to the sense of sight. And this happens because this sense is most sufficient for knowing and declares many differences of things. ¶ Animals, therefore, are produced by nature together with sensation. From this, memory does not occur in some, but it does in others. And for that reason, among those who have memory, some are prudent, and others are more able to learn. ¶ And indeed, those are prudent without the capacity for learning who cannot hear sounds, such as bees and if there is any other such kind of animal. But every creature learns that possesses this sense hearing along with memory. ¶ Other animals, then, live by imaginations and memories, and are devoid of experience, except for a very small part. ¶ But the race of men lives also by art and reason. And from memory, indeed, experience is produced for men. For many memories of the same thing create the faculty of a single experience. ¶ And science, art, and experience seem to be almost similar. Through experience, however, art and science emerge. For experience indeed, as Polus says, speaking correctly, produces art; whereas inexperience produces fortune. Now, art occurs when from many concepts of experience, one universal estimation arises concerning similar things. For to have the estimation that this benefited the ailing Callias for this disease, and likewise Socrates, and many others individually—that is certainly a matter of experience. But to have found that it benefited everyone defined by one species who were afflicted by this sickness—such as those, for example, who abounded in phlegm original: "pituita" or bile, or were afflicted by heat—that is now seen to be a matter of art. ¶ And in respect to action, experience does not differ from art. Indeed, we see that those with experience attain the matter more than those who have the theory without the experience. And that happens because experience is the knowledge of particulars, while art is the knowledge of universals. Truly, all actions and generations are concerned with particulars. For he who heals does not heal "Man," except incidentally, but Callias, or Socrates, or some other of those who are so called, who happens to be a man.