METAPHYSICS

14 [The arts] were invented to be useful for the necessities of life, and in those places first where men were at leisure. ¶ Therefore, the mathematical arts were established around Egypt, for there the caste of priests was permitted to be at leisure. ¶ Now, it has been stated in the Ethics original: "moralibus"; referring to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, specifically Book VI, which discusses intellectual virtues like art, science, and wisdom
15 what the difference is between art and science and the other things of the same kind. But the reason we are now speaking is this: everyone considers what is called "wisdom" to be concerned with first causes and principles. ¶ Therefore (as was said before),
16 the man of experience seems wiser than those who have any sense perception at all, the craftsman original: "artifex" wiser than the man of experience, the master-craftsman original: "architectus"; here meaning the designer who understands the theory than the manual laborer, and the theoretical sciences original: "speculatiui" more than the productive ones. ¶ That, therefore,
17 wisdom is a science original: "scientia"; used here in the sense of a structured body of knowledge concerning certain causes and principles, is evident.

CHAPTER II.

18 A decorative woodcut initial V featuring a floral and scrollwork design. Since we are seeking this science, we must consider this: of what kind of causes and principles is wisdom the science? If, then, one were to review the opinions we hold regarding the wise man, perhaps from this the matter would become more apparent. First, then, we believe the wise man knows all things as far as possible, without having knowledge of them individually. Next, we consider him wise who can understand difficult things that are not easy for a man to know. For sense perception is common to everyone; therefore, it is easy and by no means constitutes a wise man. Furthermore, we think that in every science, the person who is more certain and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser. Also, of the sciences, we think that the one which is desirable for its own sake and for the sake of knowing is more truly wisdom than that which is chosen for the sake of other results. And the commanding science is more truly wisdom than the subordinate one. For it is not fitting for the wise man to be commanded, but to command; nor should he obey another, but rather the less wise should be persuaded by him. Such and so many, then, are the opinions we hold concerning wisdom and
19 wise men. ¶ Among these, the first—knowing all things—must necessarily belong to him who possesses universal knowledge to the highest degree.
20 For such a person, in a certain way, knows all the subjects. ¶ Al-

[The arts] contribute to providing the necessities, and first in those places where men first indulged in leisure. ¶ Wherefore the mathematical arts first arose around Egypt. For there it was granted that the priests might be free for leisure. ¶ It has been said, then, in the books on morals, what the difference is between art and science and the other habits of a similar kind. But the reason for which we now speak is this: for all think that the science which is named "wisdom" is about first causes and principles. ¶ Wherefore (as was said before) the craftsman seems wiser than those having any sense perception, the master-craftsman than those who only have experience, and the observer of the art original: "contemplator"; the one who contemplates the theory wiser than the one who carries it out. ¶ It is clear, then, that wisdom is a science concerning certain principles and causes.

CHAPTER II.

A decorative woodcut initial V featuring a bird (possibly a swan or goose) within a circular frame surrounded by foliage. Since we are seeking this science, we must consider this: of what causes and principles is the science of wisdom? If, therefore, anyone takes up the estimations we have regarding wise men, it will perhaps become more clear from that. First, then, we think the wise man knows all things, to the greatest extent possible, without having knowledge of them through particulars. Next, we think that man is wise who can understand things difficult for man and not easy to know. For sense perception is common to all; wherefore it is easy and hardly wise. Furthermore, we judge that in any science, the one who is more exact and more skillful in handing down principles and causes through teaching is wiser. Also, we think that science which is desirable for its own sake and for the sake of knowing is more truly wisdom than that which exists for the sake of the outcome. And the more authoritative science is more wisdom than the serving one. For we think that the wise man should not receive commands but give them, and that the less wise should obey him, not he the other. Such, then, and so many are the estimations we have regarding wisdom and wise men. ¶ Of these, the first—to know all—necessarily belongs to him who has universal science to the highest degree; for he knows, in a certain way, the whole of the subject matter. ¶ Al-