Aristotle's Metaphysics

In truth, those things are most difficult for humans to know which are most universal Universal concepts are the most abstract and broad, such as "being" or "unity."; for they are farthest removed from the senses. ¶ Furthermore, the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles. For those sciences derived from fewer [principles] are more exact than those which add further details; in this way, it is clear that Arithmetic is more exact than Geometry Aristotle argues that Arithmetic is more fundamental because it deals with numbers alone, whereas Geometry adds the concept of spatial position.. ¶ But indeed, that science seems more suited for teaching which contemplates causes more. For those who tell and assign the causes for individual things are the ones who teach. ¶ To know and to understand for the sake of knowing and understanding belongs most to that science which is concerned with the most knowable thing. For he who desires to know for its own sake will most desire that which is science in the highest degree; and such is the science of the most knowable. Now, first principles and causes are most knowable. For because of these and from these, other things are known; but these are not known through the things underlying them The "subiecta" or underlying things are the specific, physical examples we see with our eyes, which are less "knowable" in a purely intellectual sense than the laws that govern them.. ¶ Also, the most sovereign of sciences, and more so than the subordinate ones, is that which knows the purpose for which each thing must be done. This is the "good" in individual things, and altogether what is the highest good in all of nature. ¶ From all that has been said, the name we seek [Wisdom] falls upon the same science. For it must be the contemplator of the first principles and causes. For the highest good, and that for the sake of which things are done, is one of the causes This refers to the "Final Cause," or the purpose for which something exists.. ¶ That it is not a productive science A "productive" science would be a craft or a technology used to make something. is clear even from those who first philosophized. For because of wonder original: "admirationes"; the Greek "thaumazein," meaning a sense of awe or puzzlement that triggers inquiry., men both now and at first began to philosophize. At the beginning, they wondered at the easy marvels; then, proceeding little by little, they began to doubt about greater things, such as the changes of the moon and sun, the stars, and even the origin of the universe. ¶ He who doubts and wonders thinks he is ignorant. Therefore, even the lover of myths original: "fabularum amator" is in some way a philosopher; for a myth is composed of wonders. ¶ So, if they philosophized to escape ignorance, it is clear they followed science for the sake of knowledge and not for any utility. Evidence of this is found in what has happened. For when nearly all the necessities for living easily and with pleasure were present—

In truth, those things are also most difficult for humans to know which are most universal; since they are the most remote from the senses. ¶ Moreover, those sciences are more certain which deal most with first principles. For those that are from fewer [principles] are more certain than those spoken of with additions, such as Arithmetic compared to Geometry. ¶ But indeed, that science teaches more which speculates on causes. For they teach who state the causes of individual things. ¶ Understanding and knowing for their own sakes belongs chiefly to that science which is of that which is most knowable. For he who chooses to know for its own sake will chiefly choose that which is science in the highest degree; and such is the science of what is most knowable. Now, the most knowable things are the first principles and the causes. For because of these and from these, other things are known, but these are not known through the underlying things. ¶ Moreover, the most sovereign of the sciences, and more sovereign than the subordinate one, is that which knows the reason why each thing must be done. This is the good of each thing, and universally what is best in all of nature. ¶ Therefore, from all that has been said, the name that is sought falls upon the same science. For it is necessary that this be the speculative science of first principles and causes. For both the good and "that for the sake of which" are among the causes. ¶ That it is not a practical science original: "factiua"; relating to making or doing. is clear even from the first people who philosophized. For because of wonder, men both now and at first began to philosophize. At the start, they wondered at those things which were easier among the things to be doubted. Then, proceeding little by little further, they also doubted about greater things: such as the passions original: "passionibus"; here meaning the phases or phenomena. of the moon, and those things which happen regarding the sun and stars, and concerning the generation of the universe. ¶ He who doubts and wonders thinks himself ignorant. Therefore, the philosopher is in some way a lover of myths, because a myth is composed of wonderful things. ¶ Therefore, if they philosophized to flee ignorance, it is clear that they pursued knowing itself for the sake of understanding, and not for the sake of any utility. This is witnessed by the very thing that happened. For when almost all things were discovered which lead to necessities and to ease and to the passing of life—