Aristotle's Metaphysics

Johannes Argyropoulos

SINCE it is established that we must acquire the science of the first causes (for we say we know each thing when we believe we recognize its first cause), and since causes are spoken of in four ways, we ought to bring them forward here. Thus, one cause we say is the substance and the quiddity original: "quidditatem," a Scholastic term meaning the "what-ness" or essence of a thing. For the first "why" of a thing is reduced ultimately to its definition. The cause and principle is that which is first assigned when the "why" is asked. The second cause is the matter and the subject. The third is that from which comes the beginning of motion. The fourth is that which is opposite to this: that for the sake of which other things happen, namely the Good itself. For this is the end Greek: telos of all generation and all motion. Although we have contemplated these causes in our writings on nature Aristotle refers here to his work The Physics, we must nevertheless take up our ancestors who approached the contemplation of reality before us, so that we may see the truth more clearly. For it is certain that they also spoke of certain principles and causes. ¶ Therefore, if we bring their opinions into the open, something will surely emerge that is suited to the purpose of this teaching. For we will either find some other kind of cause, or we will now place greater trust in those causes already mentioned. ¶ Most of those who first practiced philosophy thought that those things which are placed under the category of matter were the only principles of all things. For they say that the element and principle of things is that from which all things come into being—appearing from it first—and into which they are finally corrupted Meaning "decomposed" or "dissolved". While the substance remains, it undergoes changes in its attributes. For this reason, they think nothing is truly created or destroyed, because such a nature is always preserved. Just as we do not say that Socrates simply "becomes" when he becomes good or musical, nor that he is simply "destroyed" when he loses these habits; for the subject himself—Socrates—remains. So it is with all other things. ¶ For there must be some one nature, or more than one, from which other things come into being while that nature itself persists. However, they do not all agree on the number or the form of such a principle. But Thales, the first author of such philosophy, says it is water. Which...

Bessarion

SINCE it is manifest that one must receive the science of the first causes (for we say we know each thing when we think we have known its first cause), and since causes may be spoken of in a fourfold way: one cause we say is the substance and "that which it was to be" original: "quod quid erat esse," a literal translation of the Greek to ti en einai, referring to the essence or formal cause, for the first "wherefore" is referred back to the ultimate definition, and the first "wherefore" is itself a cause and principle; another is the matter and the subject; the third is that from whence comes the beginning of motion; the fourth is the cause opposite to that, namely "that for the sake of which" and the Good, for this is the end of all motion and generation. Although these things have been sufficiently studied in the books on natural things, let us nevertheless summon those who came before us to the investigation of beings and who philosophized concerning the truth. For it is evident that they too speak of certain principles and causes. ¶ It will therefore be profitable to this treatise now if we briefly repeat those views. For either we will find another kind of cause, or we will certainly have more faith in those which have now been stated. ¶ Most of those who first practiced philosophy thought that those things alone which are in the form of matter are the principles of all things. For they say that this element—and this principle of all beings—is that from which all beings are, and from which they first come to be, and into which they are finally destroyed, the substance remaining while the passions Accidental qualities or changes are changed. And because of this, they believe nothing is created or destroyed, as if such a nature were always preserved. Just as we do not say Socrates simply "becomes" when he is made handsome or musical, nor is he "destroyed" when he loses these habits; because the subject, Socrates himself, remains. So it is with nothing else. ¶ For there must be some nature, either one or many, from which the rest of things come to be, while that nature is preserved. However, they do not all state the same plurality or form of this principle. But Thales, the leader of this kind of philosophy, says it is water. Which...

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Thales.