BESSARIO | ARGYROPYLUS

Chapter 5.

61 ...says that the One itself is God. ¶ These men, therefore (as we have said), are to be passed over in our present inquiry. Two of them, Xenophanes and Melissus, may be entirely set aside as being somewhat more unrefined. Parmenides, however, seems to have spoken with more insight. For judging that whatever exists besides Being itself is non-Being and nothing, he necessarily thinks that Being itself is one and nothing else. Regarding this, we have spoken more clearly in our books on nature original: "de naturalibus"; Aristotle is referring to his work the Physics.. But being compelled to follow the things that appear, and thinking that according to reason there is one, but according to the senses there are many, he again posits two causes and two principles: the hot and the cold, which is to say fire and earth. Of these, he places one—namely the hot—alongside Being; the other 62 he places with non-Being. ¶ From what has been said, then, and from those wise men who have applied themselves to reason, we have received these things: from the earliest, a corporeal principle (for water and fire and such things are bodies); and of these, some posited one and others many corporeal principles, yet both groups treated these as being in the category of matter original: "materiæ specie". From others, we received this same cause, and along with it, the source from which motion begins; and this source some made one, and some two. Until the Italians The "Italian" school refers to philosophers active in Southern Italy, specifically the Pythagoreans and Eleatics., therefore, and apart from them, the others spoke more poorly about these things; except that, as we said, they used two causes, and of these, some make the source of motion one, and some two.
The Italians.

The Pythagoreans.

The Pythagoreans, however, spoke of two principles in the same way. But they added this much, which is unique to them: they did not think that the finite, the infinite, and the one were any other natures—such as fire or earth or anything similar—but that the infinite itself and the one itself were the substance substantia of those things of which they are predicated. For which reason they also said that number is the substance of all things. ¶ In 63 this manner, then, they spoke of these things, and they began to speak of and define the "whatness" original: "quid est"; referring to the formal cause or essence of a thing. of a thing; but they treated it very simply—

...says that God himself is the One itself. ¶ These, therefore, as we said, are to be set aside in this investigation. Two of them, I say—Xenophanes and Melissus—because they seem somewhat lacking and unrefined. Parmenides, however, seems in some places to speak with more vision. For judging that besides that which is, that which is not is nothing, he thinks that what is must necessarily be one and nothing else. Regarding this, we have spoken more clearly in those things said concerning nature. But since he was compelled to follow the things that are seen, he posited that it is one according to reason, but many according to sense. And he brought forward again two causes and two principles: namely, the hot and the cold, as fire and earth. One of these he positions as that which is, and the other as that which is not. ¶ From the things said, therefore, and from the wise men who have already applied themselves to this discourse, we have received this much: from the first, that the principle itself is corporeal. For fire, water, and such things are bodies. Of these, some posited one, others many; yet both groups placed these as matter. From some, however, we received this same cause and, in addition, that from which is the principle of motion. And this, some made one, and some two. Until the Italians, therefore, and besides them, the others spoke more vaguely about these things. Truly (as we have said) they use two causes; and of these, some make the source of motion one, and some two. The Pythagoreans, however, said that there were two principles in the same way. But they added this much, which is indeed unique to them: for they did not think that the finite and the infinite and the one were some other natures, such as fire or earth or any other such thing. Instead, they thought that the infinite itself and the one itself were the substance of those things of which they are spoken. For which reason, they said that number is the substance of all things. ¶ Regarding these things, then, they spoke in this manner. And they began to speak of and define the "whatness" of a thing, but they treated it very simply—

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