ARGYROPYLUS | BESSARIO

b.ij.

...indeed, some speak of the principle as matter, whether they suppose it to be one or many, and whether they pose it as a body or something incorporeal. For instance, Plato speaks of the "Great and the Small," the Italians The Pythagoreans of Southern Italy of the "Infinite," Empedocles of fire, earth, air, and water, and Anaxagoras of the infinite number of "parts that are alike" original: "similium partium"; a reference to Anaxagoras's theory of homoeomeries, where every substance is made of smaller parts of the same substance. All these, therefore, touched upon such a cause. Additionally, those who posed air, fire, or water—or something denser than fire but subtler than air—did the same; for there are those who said the primary element was of this nature. These thinkers touched upon this cause alone. Others, however, touched upon the source from which motion begins, such as those who make "Concord and Discord," or "Mind," or "Desire" the principle. But as for "Quiddity" the "whatness" or essential nature of a thing or Substance, no one has rendered it clearly. Those who speak of it most are those who posit the "Forms" original: "formas"; the Platonic Ideals. For they do not think the Forms—or the things contained within the Forms—are the matter of sensible things, nor the source of motion; for they say the Forms are rather the cause of immobility and of things being at rest. However, they assign the Quiddity of the Form to each individual thing, and the "One" to the Forms themselves. Regarding that "for the sake of which" The Final Cause, or the purpose and goal of an action actions, changes, and motions occur, they do call it a cause in a certain way, but not in the way its nature requires. For those who speak of "Mind" or "Concord" posit these causes as a certain "Good," yet they do not say that anything exists or is made for the sake of these things, but rather that motions flow from them. Similarly, those who say that "Being" or "the One" is such a nature say it is the cause of substance, but they do not say it exists or is made for the sake of this. Consequently, they both say and do not say that the "Good" itself is a cause; for they do not say it simply, but only by accident. All these thinkers, therefore, seem to testify that we have correctly determined the number and types of causes, since they are unable to touch upon any other cause. Furthermore, it is clear that principles must be sought either in all these ways or in one of these modes. After this, we must examine how each of these thinkers spoke and what difficulties arise regarding the principles themselves. CHAPTER VII.

...indeed, some posit the principle as matter, whether they suppose it to be one or many, and whether they pose it as a body or incorporeal: as Plato, saying the "Great and the Small," and the Italians, the "Infinite." Empedocles: fire, earth, water, and air. Anaxagoras: the infinity of "parts that are alike." All these, therefore, touched upon such a cause. And furthermore, those who posed air, or fire, or water, or something denser than fire and thinner than air; for some said the primary element was such. These, therefore, touched upon this cause alone. But certain others touched upon the source of motion: namely, those who make "Friendship and Strife," "Intellect," or "Love" the principle. But as for the "essence of what it was to be" original: "quod quid erat esse"; a literal translation of the Greek 'to ti en einai,' meaning the core definition or formal cause of a thing and Substance, no one has clearly assigned them. Those who speak of them most are those who posit the "Species" Platonic Forms. For they do not think the Species—and what exists within the Species—are either the matter for sensible things, or the source from which motion arises. Instead, they say these are rather the cause of immobility and rest. They attribute the "essence of what it was to be" to each individual thing through the Species, and the "One" to the Species themselves. Regarding that "for the sake of which" The Final Cause actions, changes, and motions occur, they do in a certain way call it a cause, but not in the way it is naturally suited to be. For those who speak of "Intellect" or "Friendship" posit these as a certain "Good." However, they do not speak as if any of the things that exist are, or are made, for the sake of these; rather, they speak as if their motions were derived from them. Similarly, those who say that the "One" or "Being" is this nature say it is the cause of substance, but not that things exist or are made for its sake. Thus, it happens that they in some way say and deny that the "Good" is such a cause. For they do not speak of it simply, but according to accident. Since, therefore, the number and types of causes have been correctly determined, all these thinkers also seem to testify for us, as they cannot reach any other cause. Moreover, it is clear that principles must be sought either in all these ways or in one of these modes. How each of these thinkers spoke, and how the matter stands regarding principles—and the difficulties that may occur—let us run through these things next. CHAPTER VII.