METAPHYSICS

Argyropylus. Bessarion.

15Concerning these matters, let these things be said: regarding those who posit a single cause (of the kind we have described). ¶ The same things can be said even if someone posits several of these, as Empedocles said that the material consists of four bodies The four classical elements: earth, water, air, and fire.; for to him, some things happen in the same way, and some in a way peculiar to his system. For we see these elements generated from one another in turn, since fire, air, and earth do not always remain as the same persisting substance. We have spoken about these matters in the books On Nature original: "de natura"; referring to Aristotle's Physics.. Concerning the cause of things that are moved—whether one or two causes should be posited—it must be thought that nothing has been said entirely correctly or with sound reasoning. Furthermore, for those who speak in this way, it is altogether necessary that alteration original: "alterationem"; the type of change where a substance remains the same but its qualities change. be removed from their system. For cold will not come from hot, nor hot from cold. For what would the opposites themselves undergo, and what would be that single nature which becomes fire and water? This, indeed, he does not say.

16¶ But if anyone should think that Anaxagoras spoke of two elements, they would think so primarily according to a reason which he himself did not treat clearly, yet which he would have followed if someone had led him to it. For although it is absurd in other ways to say that all things were mixed together in the beginning—both because it follows that things must have existed unmixed before, and because it is not natural for anything to be mixed with just anything—and furthermore, because it results in properties and accidents being separated from substance (for mixture and separation belong to the same things). ¶ Yet if one follows what he wishes to say by examining it more precisely, he might perhaps be seen to say something quite remarkable. 17For when nothing was yet segregated, it is clear that nothing could truly be said of that substance. For example, it was neither white, nor black, nor grey, nor any other color, but was necessarily colorless; for it would have to have one of these colors if it were not. Similarly, it would be tasteless, and by the same reasoning, nothing else of the kind. For it was not possible for it to be of any quality, nor of any quantity, nor to be any specific thing. For some particular form would have to be in it; but this is impossible if all things were mixed, as they would then already be segregated. 18But he said all things were mixed except for Mind original: "mentem" / Greek: "Nous"; Anaxagoras's principle of cosmic intelligence.; and that this alone was unmixed and pure. ¶ From these things it follows that he identifies the principles as: the One itself (for this is simple and unmixed), and the Other, which we posit as the Indefinite original: "indefinitum"; matter in its purely potential state before receiving form., before it is defined and participates in some form.

76Regarding those who posit one cause (of the kind we mentioned), let these things be said. ¶ The same applies even if someone posits several, as Empedocles says the four bodies are the matter. For to him, it is necessary that some things happen in the same way and some in a peculiar way. For we see that they are produced from one another, as if fire and earth do not always remain the same body. But this has been discussed in the Books on Nature. And concerning the cause of moving things, whether one or two should be posited, it must be judged that nothing has been said entirely correctly or irrationally. And those who speak thus must simply do away with alteration. For cold will not come from hot, nor hot from cold. What would the opposites themselves undergo, and what is that single nature that becomes fire and water? He says nothing of this.

Empedocles.

77¶ But if someone thinks Anaxagoras speaks of two elements, they will judge it mostly according to a reasoning which he himself did not fully digest. He would, however, necessarily follow those who introduced it. Since it would be absurd elsewhere to say that all things were mixed from the beginning, both because it results in things having to be unmixed beforehand, and because it is not natural for anything to be mixed with anything. And besides: because passions and accidents would be separated from substances. For mixture and separation belong to the same things. 78¶ Yet if one follows his words along with what he intends to say, perhaps he might seem to say something new. For when nothing was separated, it is clear that nothing was truly to be said of that substance. I mean that it was neither white, nor black, nor grey, nor any other color, but was necessarily lacking in color. For otherwise it would have had one of these colors. Similarly also without taste. By the same reasoning, nothing else of the sort. For it is not possible for that to be of any quality, nor quantity, nor any specific thing. For some of the species which are spoken of in part would certainly be in it. 79But this is impossible if all things are mixed; for they would then be already separated. But he says all things are mixed, with the exception of intellect original: "intellectu"; another translation of the Greek "Nous".. This alone he says is unmixed and pure. ¶ From these things, it follows that he speaks of principles as: the One itself (for this is simple and unmixed), and the Other, as a kind of being which we posit as indeterminate before it is determined and participates in some species.

Anaxagoras.