METAPHYSICS

Therefore, these things are said neither correctly nor clearly; yet he Likely referring to Anaxagoras or previous thinkers mentioned on the preceding page. wishes to say something similar both to what those who came after say and to what now appears more evident. Truly, these arguments concern only those matters relating to generation and corruption original: "generationem & corruptionem"; the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away. and motion. For they investigate principles and causes almost exclusively for such a substance The physical, changing world.. However, whoever speculates about all beings in general—positing some beings as sensible original: "sensibilia"; things that can be perceived by the senses. and others as non-sensible—it is clear that they investigate both kinds. Therefore, one should dwell longer on what they say well or not well regarding the inquiry we have proposed.

Those, therefore, who are called Pythagoreans use principles and elements in a more foreign way than the physiologists original: "physiologi"; early natural philosophers who studied the physical world.. The reason is that they did not take these principles from sensible things. For among the beings that are mathematical, they are without motion, except for those relating to astrology original: "astrologiam"; here referring to the study of the movements of celestial bodies, or astronomy.. Nevertheless, they discuss and treat all things concerning nature. Indeed, they describe the birth of the heavens, and concerning its changes, parts, and works, they observe what follows; they exhaust their principles and causes upon these, as if they agreed with the other natural philosophers that "being" is whatever is sensible and what is contained by that which is called the heaven. Yet the causes and principles they mention are sufficient (as they say) even to ascend to higher beings, and are more suited to those than to the arguments concerning nature. However, they say nothing about how there will be motion, if only the finite and infinite and the even and odd original: "finito & infinito / & pari & impari"; the fundamental Pythagorean dualities used to explain the universe. are assumed; nor how it is possible for generation and corruption to exist without motion and change, or for the works of the things that move through the heaven to exist. Furthermore, whether one grants them that magnitude Physical size or dimension. consists of these, or if this were demonstrated: how, nevertheless, will some bodies be light and others possess weight? From the things they suppose and say, they speak no more of sensible bodies than of mathematical bodies. Therefore, they have said nothing about fire, water, or other such bodies, as if they were saying nothing specific about sensible things themselves. Likewise, how must one think that the properties of number, and number itself, are the causes of those things which exist from the begin—

Therefore, he speaks neither correctly nor clearly. Yet he wishes to say something similar to what those who came after have said, and what now appears more evident. But indeed, these men spoke in a way suited only to those discourses which concern generation, corruption, and motion. For they seek principles and causes almost exclusively regarding such substance. But it is evident that those who perform a contemplation of all things that exist—positing some of them as sensible and others as non-sensible—make a consideration of both kinds. Therefore, one will tarry longer with them, inquiring what they said well or not well toward the consideration of the things now proposed to us. Therefore, those who are called Pythagoreans use principles and elements beyond what the natural philosophers do, for the reason that they did not take them from sensible things. For mathematical things are devoid of motion, except for those with which astrology is concerned. Yet they differ and treat all things concerning nature. They describe the generation of the heaven: and they preserve that which happens regarding its parts, affects, and works. And they exhaust their principles and causes on these, as if agreeing with the other natural philosophers; and thinking that what "is," is only that which is sensible, and is contained by that which we are accustomed to call the heaven. But they say the causes and principles (as we have said) are sufficient even for ascending to those things which are higher, and are more suited to those than to the discourses which are made concerning nature. Yet in what way motion will exist—if only the finite and infinite, and the even and odd are assumed—or in what way it can happen that there is generation and corruption without motion or change, or the works of those things which are carried in the heaven: they say nothing at all. Furthermore, if it be granted to them that magnitude consists of these, or if it be shown: in what way will some of the bodies be light and others heavy? For from the things they suppose and say, they speak no more of mathematical bodies than of sensible ones. Therefore, they have said nothing at all about fire or earth or other such bodies, as if saying nothing (as I judge) specific about the sensible things themselves. Furthermore, in what way is it necessary to assume that the affects of number and number itself are the causes of those things which from the begin—