METAPHYSICS

Chapter 7. ...and that which is relative original: "ad aliquid"; a category of being that exists only in relation to something else, like "larger." would be prior to that which exists through itself original: "per se"; an independent substance.. Indeed, all the consequences followed by those who hold opinions about the Ideas have actually contradicted their own principles. Likewise, according to the belief by which we say Ideas exist, there will be Forms original: "species"; the perfect templates or "types" of things. not only of substances, but also of many other things. For there is a single concept not only concerning substances, but also concerning all other things; and there are sciences not only of substance, but of other things as well. Infinite other such contradictions occur. But by necessity, and according to the opinions held about them, if the Forms can be participated in, it is necessary that there be Ideas of substances alone. For participation in them does not happen by accident original: "secundum accidens"; a non-essential property, like being "tall" or "musical."; rather, it is necessary for each thing to participate in a Form only insofar as that Form is not predicated of a subject. I mean, for example, if something participates in the "Double itself," it also participates in the "Eternal," but only by accident; for it happens by accident that the "Double" is eternal. Therefore, the Forms will be substances. These signify substance both here [in the sensible world] and there [in the world of Ideas]. Or will there be any sense in saying that something exists beyond these: a "one in many"? This refers to the "Problem of Universals"—how one single Form can be present in many individual physical objects. And if the same Form belongs both to the Ideas and to those things that participate in them, there will be something common to both. For why should the "Duality" be one and the same in the case of perishable pairs and the many (yet eternal) mathematical pairs, any more than in the case of "this" duality and "that" particular duality? And if the Form is not the same, it will be a mere case of homonymy original: "aequivocatio"; using the same word for two entirely different things., just as if someone were to call both the man Callias and a piece of wood a "man," without perceiving any common relationship between them. But most of all, one might doubt: what do the Forms contribute to the eternal things among the sensible, or to those that come into being and pass away? For the Forms are the causes of neither motion nor any change for them. Furthermore, they do not help toward the knowledge of other things (for the Forms are not the substance of these things, otherwise they would be within them), nor do they contribute to their existence, since they are not present in the participating things. Perhaps they might be thought of as causes in the same way that "white" mixed into an object makes it a white object. But this argument—which Anaxagoras A pre-Socratic philosopher who believed all things were mixed in a primordial soup. proposed first, and Eudoxus A student of Plato who suggested that Forms were literally mixed into physical things. later, along with others—can be easily refuted. For it is easy to gather many impossible absurdities against such an opinion. Furthermore, other things do not come from the Forms according to any of the ways that are usually stated.

Anaxagoras. Eudoxus.

...and that which is relative would be prior to that which is in itself. Indeed, all those things by which some people, following opinions about the Ideas, have contradicted their own principles. 29 Furthermore, by the very reasoning through which we say Ideas exist, there will be Forms not only of substances, but also of many other things. For that which is conceived by the mind is a "one," not only regarding substances but also regarding the rest. And sciences are not only of substance, but also of others. And infinite other such things happen. But by the necessity of the opinions 30 held about them: if the Forms are participated in, it is necessary that there be Ideas of substances only. For things do not participate by accident; rather, it is necessary for each thing to participate in that which is not said of a subject. For example, if something participates in the "Double itself," it also participates in the "Perpetual," but by accident; for it is an accident of the Double to be perpetual. Therefore, the Forms will be substances; and these signify substance both here and there. Or what will it mean to have said that the "one itself" is something in the many, beyond those things themselves? And if the Form of those Ideas and of the things which participate in them is the same, there will surely be something common. For why, in these dualities which perish and the many eternal dualities, is the predication of "Duality" more one and the same than in "this" duality and "any" duality? If, however, the Form is not the same, the name will merely be common, exactly as if someone called both Callias and a piece of wood a "man," having seen no common principle in them. But most of all, 31 one might doubt: what do the Forms contribute to perpetual sensible things, or to these which arise and fall? For they are the causes of neither motion nor any change for them. Moreover, they conduct nothing toward the knowledge of other things. For those Forms are not the substance of these things; otherwise, they would be in them. Nor do they contribute to their being, since they are not present in these things which are participants. But perhaps in this way they will seem to be causes: as white color mixed with a body is the cause of the mixed body. But this talk can be very easily diminished; which Anaxagoras indeed said first, and Eudoxus later, and certain others. For it is very easy to bring many absurd and impossible things against an opinion of this sort. Furthermore, other things are not from the Forms themselves according to any of the ways that have been customarily stated.