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perceiveth them well, neither do those things greatly move my mind, which only have a colour and shadowed show of truth, being set out with slanting pride, and glory of words, but yet truth have they none.
Thou art far wide, Axiochus, and reasonest unskilfully, joining the feeling of evil with the want of good things, forgetting thyself that then thou shalt be in the number of the senseless dead. For him indeed which is bereft of all good things, doth the contrary force of evil things greatly vex. But he which hath no being, can take nor feel nothing, in place of those things whereof he is despoiled. Then by what reason can any grief be conceived of that thing, which breedeth no sense nor perseverance of any thing which hurteth? For if in the beginning O Axiochus, thou didst not, though indeed in vain, join sense and feeling to death, most unwisely, thou shouldest never had cause to fear death. But now thou dost confound thyself, and speakest contrary to thyself, oft fearing that thou shalt be deprived of soul and sense together, and oft thinking, that with thy sense thou shalt feel that thing, whereof there is no sense nor feeling. And to this purpose do all those excellent