Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

2.1515

and the things.
These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture’s elements, with which the picture touches reality.

2.16

If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts.

2.161

There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all.

2.17

What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way that it does, is its pictorial form.

2.171

A picture can depict any reality whose form it has.
A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc.

2.172

A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.

2.173

A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly.

2.174

A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.

2.18

What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality.

2.181

A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture.

2.182

Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, for example, not every picture is spatial.)