Preface.

But, as goes without saying or should go without saying, this is a "continuation" in the sense of the freest activity of another research individuality; and this activity has led to a dissent between us regarding some important matters, for which I have lacked the opportunity to take a position in a sufficiently reasoned manner until now. This is now demanded of me by the fact that the two areas of work that have hitherto almost exclusively occupied my efforts—the main area of intellectual-psychological-epistemological studies and the secondary area of emotional-psychological-ethical studies—have proven to be closely linked in an entirely unexpected measure through the scope of the assumptions. So much so that, if I see it correctly, the assumptions could play a substantial part in the eventual resolution of the dissent in question. It was therefore appropriate to bring this up in the present writing: I have merely considered myself authorized, under the given circumstances, not to exclude relevant matters from the discussion, even if they could not be brought into direct connection with the theory of assumptions. In any case, the reader will find the paragraphs 47–51 at the beginning of the eighth chapter expressly designated as those that are relatively furthest removed from the actual subject of this work.

At this point, however, the reference to the beginnings of the psychological theory of value provides me with the desired occasion for a remark on my own behalf, which I link first to the most recent ethical literature report of the "Archiv für systematische Philosophie" Archive for Systematic Philosophy, where mention is made, incidentally, of myself and EHRENFELS

¹ Regarding how the most important positions that the "System" brings could nevertheless be published about a year before my "Investigations into the Theory of Value," see EHRENFELS in the 1894 volume of the mentioned journal, p. 96, and incidentally also my preface to the "Investigations."