The Remaining Works of Benedictus de Spinoza

For he asserts theoretically not just a union or joining, but a simple and intrinsic unity of finite things with the Infinite. It does not seem that any remedy can be opposed to this error other than this: that the philosopher should more often and solicitously render an account to himself of the method he ought to follow in reasoning, and should not rest in that rigid connection of consequences as a criterion of truth, but should decide to revoke the first premises he assumes to a severe examination as often as he elicits a new porisma corollary/deduction. For the nobility of truth cannot be proven by a genealogical deduction, as if the matter were settled because eight or sixteen pure forebears follow one another. It cannot be deemed sufficiently proven—that spiritual nobility, hē alētheia the truth—unless the entire stem of consequences ascends to its first origin without a stain, and unless this very origin is itself illustrious in its certainty of the series.

But I stop. For readers will say it ill becomes an editor to act as the censor of an author. And what an author indeed! I am glad that I am certain of this: that this very author, if it were to happen that one could call him alive, would never receive these doubts of ours with an offended spirit, nor would he be irritated by others philosophizing according to their own genius. Moreover, I thought that the second of the two points I brought up should be explained for this reason: so that it might be clear that the theoretical intellect is not necessarily driven to Pantheism (which has indeed seemed to be the case to some philosophers, though I think it would detract too much from the powers of the intellect!).