The Complete Works of Claudius Galen, Vol. 18 Pt. 2

...are not, however, foreign to an exegesis, which explains the meanings of the terms found in the writings. But those matters which some of the commentators mention regarding the character of the author—even if they are useful for the exegesis or for something else—are superfluous; such as, in this passage, where they praise his modesty in saying, "it seems best to me." For they claim it was possible for him to have said: "For the physician, the pursuit of providence is best." Yet, even here, he added "it seems to me," although he intended to write proofs for his assertion. But those things which the followers of Herophilus have said in distinguishing prognosis (foreknowledge) from prorrhēsis (prediction) are not only useless or inappropriate to the meanings, but are also sophistical and false. And yet, they appear to teach the differences of things, not to legislate on meanings, erring in this very point first: that they are ignorant of the fact that their discourse is concerning meanings, not concerning the nature of things useful to medicine. For the knowledge contained under the term "prognosis" is indeed spoken of for the most part in reference to what is certain, though at times...

...they are not, however, foreign to an exegesis, which explains the meanings of the terms. But those things which most of the interpreters have handed down regarding the character of the author, although they may be useful in some respect, exceed the manner of an exegesis; for instance, when in this passage they commend his modesty, in that he said it seemed best to him. For they say that he could have spoken thus: "For a physician, the study of providence is best." He himself, however, added "it seems to me," even though he was about to demonstrate that very thing later. But the things which Herophilus discussed regarding the distinction between praecognitio (prognosis) and praedictio (prediction) not only have no utility and are improperly stated, but are also sophistical and false. And yet, he himself believes he is handing down the differences of things, not inventing new meanings. In which matter he errs in this first: that he is ignorant that he is discoursing about the meaning of names, not about the nature of things which contribute to medicine. For the knowledge which is contained in the name of praecognitio is wont to be used for the most part regarding a certain and stable thing, which nevertheless, if it also...