Institutes of Oratory

infinite and general, which is called a thesis original: "θέσις", a word borrowed from the Mathematicians; or it is finite and specific, which is called a hypothesis original: "ὑπόθεσις". For sometimes an Orator must ascend from a finite question to an infinite one. Additionally, an infinite question can be treated by the Orator either separately or, as many mistakenly believe, for the sake of knowledge. For he will discourse with a certain flow of words on whether someone who possesses virtue owns all good things: or whether those who follow virtue for the sake of profit truly love it; as those do who measure things to be sought after by pleasure and the absence of pain. It cannot be denied, however, that both these types, especially the one that aims at action, are more proper to the Orator than matters concerning the movement of the heavens and the secrets of nature. Therefore, even if an Orator can speak on these subjects, Aristotle, after assigning "each specific thing" original: "τὸ ἕκαστον" (to hekaston) to the Orator, later explicitly restricts this universality to things that come under consultation. Hermagoras was also of this opinion, just as Cicero defends it in the second book of On the Orator through the character of Antonius. The ancients used to practice only in such material. For * Quintilian, Book 2, chapter 4. around the times of Demetrius of Phalerum, declaimers first began to train themselves in questions limited by specific people and other circumstances, in imitation of the law courts.

THE MOST PROPER subject matter for the Orator is the hypothesis original: "ὑπόθεσις" or finite question, which the older writers call a Cause, and the younger writers also call a Controversy * Marcus Seneca.. And from this, Aristotle clearly says in Book 1, chapter 3, that there are * Three types of Rhetoric in number. three types of Rhetoric. Likewise, Cicero, echoing Aristotle, subjects only the finite question to the Orator in the first book of the Rhetorics, specifically considered as far as persuasion is possible. Boethius does the same in Book 4 of his commentary on Cicero’s Topics. I will follow their opinions more willingly because my intention is that these commentaries should not only provide light to our Oratorical Partitions: but also serve as a guide and a commentary on the ancient Rhetoricians, especially Aristotle. For neither I, nor any wise person, can approve of the plan of those who act so that, by casting out the ancients, they might hold the kingdom alone. Therefore, following the example of the ancients, I myself will treat the hypothesis generally and point by point with greater care: I will touch upon other matters only briefly. No one should fear that if this is done, the imperfection of Rhetoric will fail the hopes of its users. For although Rhetoricians properly and primarily look at the hypothesis, they do not record in their writings only those things that are primarily within it: indeed, if they had done that, I say confidently that they would not even have perfectly explained the hypothesis itself.