To the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord, Lord Hippolytus d'Este Cardinal of the Catholic Church (1479–1520), son of Ercole I d'Este., Cardinal Deacon of Saint Lucy in Silice, a Letter of Laurentius Maiolus of Genoa.

When I received your most pleasant letter from Pannonia ancient Roman province, corresponding to parts of modern Hungary, Austria, and the Balkans, in which you received me among your familiars out of your kindness and with the greatest willingness, and you signified that you would confirm the matter upon your arrival in Italy, I decided with myself to offer you something according to my strength so that I might be more pleasing to you in person, having seemed so pleasing to you only through letters. I do not, by Hercules, think that I will obtain that with you through the goods of fortune or the body; for in this age, almost all philosophers are needy, and those who philosophize are in want, or rather are miserable and wretched. And what is harsher to them than to almost everyone else, and commonly ridiculed by the mob, is the widely held opinion that most of those who dominate and rule despise both philosophers and philosophy. Indeed, those who are despised and deviate from philosophy often become the most wicked of all. They are entirely impious toward God and behave like monsters and beasts toward their own kind, human beings; as those who, by the greatness of their genius, might have been promoted to the best things through philosophy, once it is abandoned, they slide deeply into the worst. As for others, mortals are gifted by nature in many ways, which they care for only insofar as they serve the soul. Neither of these has fallen to my lot, whether from nature or fortune. But concerning the goods of the mind, if there are any, I will rightly claim them for myself with modesty, through many vigils, great labors, and long study. I will please you with these as much as I am able; through these, I hope to obtain your grace, because you favor the few who are studious above all others, and you receive even the absent, and you do not allow this virtue of all to be lacking in you. Therefore, I have dedicated our Epiphyllides a term derived from Greek, referring here to secondary thoughts or small supplements to a main subject (for so it pleases me to say)—as if hidden ambiguities well-discussed by our care and diligence—to you in that part of the art of disputation which treats of the judgment of syllogistic form. I intend to elaborate greater and weightier things for your name once I have perceived that these were not unwelcome to you.