Physiological Introduction or Principles of the Human Body

as the sole author of His most principal image. 2. Immaterial, namely a pure spirit; hence it contains nothing corporeal or material within itself. 3. Immortal, because, since it is in itself a substance subsisting of itself outside of matter, it is not material, nor generable, nor corruptible; hence it is neither mortal.

They say 3. That there is a union between the matter and the form of man, just as in other substantial composites, and indeed as a substantial mode really distinct from matter and form; and it is also an essential part of the human body, but a secondary one, or "that by which." The reason for the first, according to our Galenists, is: if the matter and form of man are given, without man existing, then besides the matter and form of man, something else is required. But after the death of man, the matter of man is given, namely the body, and the form of man is given, namely the rational soul, separated from the body, without man existing; therefore, something else is required. They subsume: but that other thing, which is required besides matter and form for the existence of man, is not 1. the negation of division; otherwise the whole

would be negative, and consequently all substantial things, like man, lion, etc., would not be positive entities, which, however, is contrary to everyone. Nor 2. dispositions, for example, simultaneous locations of matter and form, since dispositions are accidents, and thus no whole would be substantial, but rather accidental, since it would always include accidents as a part; for good arises only from an integral cause, while evil arises from any defect. Nor 3. The Decree of God, since no one would dare to say that man is constituted by the Decree of God as a part, and thus that the other part of man is a Divine Being; it is well allowed, however, that it is the root of the formal union between matter and form, and thus God wills that the form be united to the matter. Therefore, that other thing which is required besides matter and form for existence will be the union between matter and form; therefore, a union is given. The second reason is: because the union must be an entity that removes the indifference of matter and form, and so that they may be united, it must also exist in at least one of the extremes, perfecting it. But this entity is modal, or such an entity as, when given, not even by divine power can