Works of Dionysius

unity. The One, therefore, is itself more excellent than being. Wherefore, it is permitted to name the One simply. But to say that the One "is" is not permitted. Yet one must indulge the poverty of human speech. Furthermore, we do not call things "beings" unless they possess forms, habits, or actions. But we call "One" not only something of this kind—as, for example, one sight or one sound. But also the privation of habits, such as one blindness, one deafness, one "one" simply as a habit, and a privation equally one. Therefore, the One must be considered broader and superior to being. Finally, the participation of unity extends even to privation and prime matter. But the participation of being does not extend this far. For since being is distributed to form, prime matter and privation, insofar as they fall away from form, fall away from essence. Yet they do not degenerate from unity in the same way. For because of a singular informality, separate from others, matter is said to be "one" almost no less than a formed thing is accustomed to be called "one." Although, due to the defect of form, matter is by no means called "essence." Therefore, since the participation and empire of the One is broader than the empire of being, we rightly conclude the One is higher than being. And similarly the Good. For matter, because of its potentiality and appetite toward the Good, and the necessity of its being in the universe, seems not to have lost the appellation of good as equally as it has lost essence. We wish the Good and the One to be absolutely the same. For the Good, like the One, perfects and preserves all things through union. Wherefore, whatever falls away from union likewise falls away from essence and the Good. Now, since this pertains most to the first principle of things, as well as to super-eminent simplicity and singularity, and to the propagation of virtue diffused everywhere, it is rightly named the One from that, and from this it is named the Good. And in truth, because of that singular eminence, universal diffusion is also present. But in turn, through most ample largesse, the singular eminence is recognized. Which unity, because of its own supreme simplicity, has obtained the principate of all things, and because of its universal providence, has declared itself a beneficent empire.

Confirmation that the Good is above essence, life, and intelligence. And how we enjoy the Good more perfectly than by simply understanding.

The Good itself

is superior to being, as we also said in the preceding pages. By a similar reason, it can be confirmed that it is more excellent than life. Since life is not enough for itself by itself, except by the grace of the Good. For they do not opt for life simply, but to live well. Indeed, they neglect and reject life when it is destitute of every good and of all hope of good. For the same reason, we place the Good before intelligence. For everyone strives to understand, and desires to understand some good for himself, and hopes for some profit from intellection. Indeed, he does not choose to understand any evil for himself, but rather to be hidden and to forget, lest he be tortured by knowing. Added to this is that few things naturally obtain intellect. But all things obtain the Good. Also, intellectual souls do not always affect intelligence, but they always affect the Good. Again, from the very beginning, by a certain natural instinct, they desire the Good; but intelligence and wisdom, they desire at last by a certain considered choice. Therefore, since the Good is both broader than intelligence and is more often and by more things desired, and is sought more by natural inquiry, it is evident that the Good is superior to the intellect. In summary, neither essence, nor life, nor mind is content with itself. For the former always strives toward life. This toward mind; the mind toward the Good by both understanding and willing. The Good, however, since it is the ultimate in resolving, does not strive toward another. Therefore, it alone is content with itself. Therefore, it alone is the first. But it helps to wander a little more broadly through these things in the manner of Plato. That essence, life, and intelligence differ among themselves is evident from the fact that intelligence is present to few, life to more, and finally essence to the most. Since, therefore, this distinction is most formal and ordered, and does not arise from matter or fortune, it rightly proceeds from a certain distinction of the first essence, life, and intelligence. A distinction, I say, smaller than that which is in things, or at least not formal.