Works of Dionysius

In which, indeed, as in transparent bodies, we perceive the divine sun, which we cannot contain in ourselves. ¶ Therefore, we are restrained by certain limits regarding the contemplation of divine things. First, because we cannot reach anything further than the ray offers. Second, because the ray itself descends into us under measure, not indeed to show us the divine nature itself, or whatever things God sees in Himself, or at least all things that come to God as the agent, but [only] fewer and lower things, though they are undoubtedly most precious when compared with others. Third, because that ray demonstrates to each one only according to their capacity. Following a certain distribution kept everywhere according to merit. Where the divine sun certainly behaves just as if the celestial sun were to temper its light to individual eyes here and there. Therefore, it offers itself as if finite to finite minds, meanwhile hiding its own infinity within itself. ¶ Finally, everyone ought to moderate oneself regarding the divine ray so that one neither falls into the worse by sloth from its excellence, nor attempts further by pride. There, indeed, holiness shines; here, however, temperance shines.
¶ Only as much of divine things should be asserted as divine inspiration declares. Also, the divine ray infuses itself according to the genius of each one.

¶ Dionysius.

No reason, therefore,
should dare to say or think anything about the hidden deity, which is superior to essence, beyond those things that the sacred utterances have divinely opened to us. For we must ascribe to Him that which is in excess of essence, and also superior to essence, which is also called ignorance. But by reason, intellect, and excellence of essence, we must strive for the heights, as much as He infuses into us, while we are restrained from the more sublime splendors by temperance and the holiness that venerates divine things. For if any faith is to be had in the most wise and most true theology, through whatever portion of the mind they are revealed, divine things are looked upon. Where, indeed, the chief goodness and justice of God, the preserver of all things, segregates the immensity itself, as if incomprehensible, from those things that fall under measure, which God regulates by His providence.
¶ God can neither be reached, nor comprehended, nor even looked upon, by essence, nor by intellect, nor through them.

¶ Marsilius.

Intelligible things
surpass sensible things; likewise, simple things [surpass] composed things; and again, incorporeal things similarly surpass corporeal things, in such a way that those superior things can neither be comprehended by these lower things, nor truly looked upon through them. ¶ Much more does the principle of the universe surpass essence, which necessarily designates a certain form, both by the immensity of its nature, and by incomparable simplicity and unity, entirely absolute, surpassing the form of the mind, as Plotinus proves [it] to be necessarily multiform. [It surpasses] thought even more, not only by multitude, but also by mobility dispersed, and most of all speech. Therefore, it can neither be comprehended nor looked upon by these, nor through these, nor through anything else that is finite. ¶ But God is unity, not having a seat in some one place, but is the cause of union and unity everywhere. Essence and intellect can be said of Him as the cause of all essence and intellect, not as some essential or intellectual form. Finally, since even the Peripatetics think that essence and being, as the most common things, are given to things by the most common principle, and [since] the most common and powerful cause of causes—and if [He is] freed from all effects—the Platonists rightly think the first principle [to be] absolute from essence and being. By what reason the intellect, however sublime, can never be the first principle, just as sight [can never be] the light, we declare more plainly in our theology.
¶ God, superior to essence and intellect, cannot be comprehended by any essence or by any intellect, or at least be discerned by his own virtue.