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to interpret it sufficiently as substance: but in large part to be expressed as essence, especially where he argues about the One and the Good, where about evil, where about matter. For philosophers do not drag into the contest with the One and the Good substance, which is one category, but essence and being, which embraces all categories. The Peripatetics certainly think being, one, and good are equal. But the Platonists, among whom our Dionysius holds the primacy, place the One and the Good outside of controversy before being, as being most ample, more simple, prior, and more sufficient. Therefore, he willingly calls the supreme God, the One and the Good, above essence. ¶ But come now, tell me, when Dionysius says that unformed matter is inferior to ousia substance/essence, will you interpret it as inferior to substance? You will say too little. For insofar as it is unformed, it is inferior in form not only to substance but also to accidents. Furthermore, where he says of evil, that it neither is nor has being. If you understand substance to be denied there, you could implicitly understand that quantity at least, or quality, could be granted to evil. Which is a thing forbidden to say. ¶ Therefore, Dionysius, together with the Platonists, does not call those things that are subject to the senses "beings" original: "entia", but he calls incorporeal substances and their properties "true beings," and he calls them "intelligibles." In which genus are intellectual souls and angelic intellects. Above these true beings, he finally introduces God, who is above the intelligible, more exalted than being. Certainly, just as every sense has a certain proportion with its sensible, so the entire sense [has] with the entire sensible. Also, what proportion sense has to the sensible, intellect holds the same toward the intelligible. Again, what proportion sense has to intellect, the sensible seems to have to the intelligible. Therefore, since both intellect and the intelligible undergo some proportion, by right God is above both, utterly absolute from all proportion. He is also above substance, which is divided under being from accident and undergoes exchange with accident. He is also above essence, which is by its nature multipliable into essences; He, however, is not to be multiplied in such a way. ¶ But because our intellect, on account of the excessive commerce with senses and sensible things, is in such a life somehow inept toward intelligibles, prudent theologians therefore clothe intelligibles with certain sensible things, and indeed with more honest ones, so that they might be more accommodated to our intellect: which tempers the intelligible light, so that it is perceived as easily as eyes see any light in bodies that is, in a way, solid; otherwise it would not be discerned at all. ¶ They are also accustomed to clothe God, who is more exalted than being and miraculously more eminent than any intelligible, with intelligible beings that pertain to angels and souls, tempering it for the intellect just as the sun itself, which otherwise could not be tolerated, is tempered for the eyes by a cloud more often than not; thus the light of the sun is safely seen through figures. ¶ For these reasons, therefore, our Plato describes soul and intellect through lines, circles, musical [ratios], numbers, curves, wings, and similar things, and depicts God in the sun. Isaiah also sees the Lord sitting on an exalted throne. And he fashions the Seraphim as winged, to leave out Ezekiel and others in the presence [of God]. ¶ In summary, I shall say that just as in the genus of sensibles, purer [things] are applied as certain veils to things to be understood; namely, points, lines, figures, unity, numbers, lights; signifying an indivisible nature by point and unity, and the certainty of intelligence by light; so they apply those things that are supreme in the order of intelligibles to God, such as essence, life, intelligence, truth, wisdom, and intelligible light. But just as those are inferior to intelligibles, so these are inferior to God. ¶ Plato describes the future resurrection of human bodies by divine power in the book De Regno On the Kingdom. Which Zoroaster once asserted. Therefore, we read in the poems of the Magi, which all the Platonists have usurped, that our soul has a celestial [body] besides the earthly body. Which will return to heaven with it as if on a certain chariot. Also, that souls dedicated to God will not leave behind their earthly body of the earth at last, but will return what the body renders to heaven, along with its celestial body, to be illuminated. In which words both the resurrection of bodies and the splendor of the blessed are asserted. ¶ Truly, just as the sun excites seeds hidden in the bowels of the earth and adorns many [of them] with most beautiful flowers, so the most splendid body of Christ, at the appointed times, with rays cast everywhere, [will adorn] those of men.