The Asclepius of Hermes Trismegistus: On the Immortality of the Soul

On the immortality of the soul. The Asclepius of Hermes.

...mortal, I argue as follows: No form of a thing that can be created and destroyed can itself be eternal, since destruction leads toward non-being; this certainly does not happen without the discarding and privation of the form. But the human soul is the form of man, who is corruptible; therefore, it is not perpetual and immortal. Furthermore, if the human intellect were perpetual, as Plato says, it would surely precede its matter; for everything perpetual precedes in time that which is generated and destroyed. But this is opposed by the Philosopher Aristotle is frequently referred to simply as "The Philosopher" in late Renaissance scholarly texts. in the 12th book of the Metaphysics, text commentary 15. Therefore, the rational soul is not perpetual.

CHAPTER IV.

The Arguments are Resolved.

1. A decorative drop cap letter 'A' is adorned with intertwining leaf and vine patterns, typical of late Renaissance book design. To the first argument, it can be said that the major premise The first, general statement in a formal logical argument (syllogism). is universally false; however, it is true regarding that which, according to appearance, is moved by another. On the other hand, the rational soul is entirely self-moving—that is, not moved by anything else from the inside or the outside. 2. To the second, I say that the authority of Averroes original: "Auer:"; Ibn Rushd, a 12th-century philosopher whose commentaries on Aristotle were central to medieval and Renaissance debate. ought to be understood as referring to those forms which depend upon and are produced by matter, which is not the case for the rational soul. Regarding the confirmation, I say that Averroes is speaking of the First Cause God, as the ultimate source of all motion. and the Intelligences Angelic or celestial beings that philosophers believed moved the heavens., which do not undergo this kind of change. 3. To the third, I say that the soul is moved by a sudden prompting and a steady infusion from God. Plato certainly did not mean this kind of motion when he said that the soul is a "self-moving number," but rather that motion which is a successive act, running through moments of time; for indeed, by gradually forming itself, the soul is moved by itself and moves itself. That its operations happen gradually and in time is caused by its own weakness, by which it is inferior to the angels. 4. To the fourth, the response is clear from what was said above: specifically, because the rational soul is not moved by any other form than itself, the induction is insufficient. Regarding the confirmation, I say that Plato was not speaking of any of those species of motion when establishing the definition of the soul, because those are passions In classical philosophy, "passions" are things one experiences or suffers passively, as opposed to "actions" which one initiates.; whereas the motions attributed to the human soul by Plato are actions, such as: to will, to consider, to care, to consult, to form correct or incorrect opinions, to rejoice, to grieve, to be daring, to fear, to hate, to love, and others of the same kind, as Plato teaches in the tenth book of The Laws. 5. To the fifth, the minor premise The second, more specific statement in a logical argument. is false regarding motion that is an action. For just as we say fire is hot through itself, we do not mean two different things—one that is hot and another that makes it hot—so clearly in the soul there are not two different things, namely the "moved" and the "mover." For being moved in the soul is not like being cut in wood; it is rather like being hot in fire. For fire is hot with no external thing heating it; so the soul moves itself without any other mover moving it. 6. To the sixth, the minor premise is false regarding that which is changeable by itself and not moved by another; such is the soul, which contains motion by its formal act and actual power. 7. To the seventh, the major premise is true regarding an inherent form A form that exists only as part of a physical object, like the shape of a bowl. which is produced from the potentiality of matter, but not regarding a form that comes from the outside. 8. To the eighth, I say that no inherent form precedes its matter; however, a subsistent form A form that can exist independently of matter, such as a soul or a spirit. can precede particular matter; yet not all matter in its entirety, regarding all its parts. Thus, the rational soul may well precede this specific man in time, but not the whole of human nature. The soul precedes matter. Or more correctly, the Philosopher's opinion can be understood this way: that no form precedes its entire matter in time, just as every moving and generating cause precedes the thing created; but the ratio The underlying logic, essence, or "blueprint" of a thing. or form is simultaneous with the thing created. Hence he says in Metaphysics 12, commentary 17: "One must inquire," he says, "whether any form remains afterward; for in some cases nothing prevents their form from remaining later, namely the intellectual soul." Therefore, the Philosopher does not say that no form precedes its matter, but rather intends that a form can...