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Hermes, Trismegistus, ca. 2./4. Jh. · 1590

Immortality.
Aristotle.
...its own immobility In this context, immobility refers to "stability" or "unchanging nature," a quality of eternal things., which it possesses from the eternity of the soul. The Philosopher Referring to Aristotle, often called "The Philosopher" in Renaissance texts. himself also stood as a perpetual pursuer of this truth, especially in refuting the opinion of those who say that the intellect is merely sense perception. If, he says, the intellect were sense perception, then all beings would be sensible Meaning perceivable only by the physical senses.; and thus the science of metaphysics, which deals with intelligible things Things understood by the mind rather than seen by the eye., would be abolished.
4.
Therefore, universal beings exist within the intellect. Likewise, in Book 1 of On the Soul, text 12, speaking of the difficulty of the science of the soul, he posed this condition: If thinking is imagination original: "phantasia", or not possible without imagination, then it is not an operation proper to the soul alone, because it cannot exist without the body. Furthermore, in text 13, he poses another condition, namely: If there is any operation proper to the soul itself, it happens to be separable from the body; but if there is not, etc.
Text 153.
In the second book, however, from text 152 to text 155, he destroys the first part of that first condition—namely, the idea that thinking is merely imagination. There, he shows most clearly that the senses differ from the intellect, and that thinking differs from perceiving through the senses. Imagination, he says, is something other than the senses—specifically the external senses—and other than the intellect.
5.
In the third book, from text 4 to 8, he teaches most clearly that the intellect is not organic meaning it does not require a physical organ, like the eye or ear, to function: and that thinking is not received in a physical organ, because thinking is not imagination. Thus, both the act of thinking and the intellect itself are non-organic.
It is not organic.
Then, from these points, several arguments can be formed: Everything that is passible capable of being acted upon, changed, or harmed by external forces is organic. But the intellect is not organic; therefore, it is not passible with a corruptive passion suffering that leads to decay, but rather a perfective one an experience that completes or improves it. Consequently, it is not corruptible. Likewise, everything material is passible. But the intellect is not material, because it is not organic; hence in Book 1 of On Generation, text 54: "Whatever things do not have their form in matter, these are indeed impassible by active forces." Therefore, the intellect is not passible. For this reason, in Book 1 of On the Soul, texts 65 and 66, he says that the intellect remains; and its connection to matter does not prove its corruption.
Separable.
Likewise, everything separable from the principle of corruption—namely, from matter—is incorruptible. But the intellect is separable from matter, as stated in Book 2 of On the Soul, text 21: "This is separated from that as the perpetual is from the corruptible." And in Book 3 of On the Soul, text 6, he says the intellect is not mixed with the soul's [physical] nature; therefore, it is not destroyed with the body.
Unmixed.
Likewise, the intellect is unmixed; therefore, it is incorruptible. This is evident because that which is unmixed is without the "temperature" the balanced mixture or "temperament" of the elements, because a mixture is a union of things that can be mixed—and this comes from the elements, which are mingled with one another. But that which lacks mixture lacks a contrary In Aristotelian physics, things decay because they are made of opposing qualities like hot/cold; something with no contrary cannot decay., and consequently is incorruptible. Therefore, the intellect is incorruptible; for so he teaches in Book 1 of On the Heavens, text 20: "The Heaven cannot be corrupted because it lacks a contrary."
It comes from without.
Likewise, that which comes from the outside is not corrupted by the corruptions of the body. But the intellect comes from without; therefore, it remains after the death of the body. Likewise, in Book 3 of On the Soul, text 4: "It is necessary for the thinker to be unmixed," because if it were mixed with the body, it would certainly be either hot, or cold, or something of that sort. But it is not of such a quality; therefore, it is not mixed.
Book 2 of The Generation of Animals, commentary 3.
In Book 1 of On the Soul, text 9, he strives with many arguments to overturn the opinion of those who say the soul is composed of contraries. The soul is the principle of motion; a "temperament" a physical blend of qualities is not the principle of motion; therefore, the soul is not a temperament, because everything that moves is driven by a predominant element. Likewise, in Book 1 of On the Heavens, text 56: Harmony and temperament are more suited to health and the virtues of the body than to the soul, as is now clear. Therefore, what suits the soul should not be attributed to the body. In Book 1 of On the Soul, text 32, having brought forward the opinions of many, he commends the opinion of Alcmaeon original: "Almeonis," a pre-Socratic philosopher and physician, who says the soul is immortal because it is similar to the immortal gods. And in text 65, he says the intellect is a certain lower [yet distinct] substance and is not corrupted.
The soul is form.
Indeed, the soul itself is not matter, nor a composite; therefore, it is form and act the actualized reality of a thing. For a man is a man through the intellect, as stated in Book 7 of the Metaphysics, text 38. And in Book 1 of On the Soul, text 66, he says that while considering and thinking may indeed wither away [with age], the intellect itself is impassible; this is because the intellect is something divine and immortal. For the senses grow old and are corrupted by the presence and intensity of a great sensible object For example, a light that is too bright can blind the eye.. The intellect, however, never grows old, and is perfected by the sight of a great intelligible object. This fact is no small proof of its immortality.