The Asclepius of Hermes Trismegistus: On the Immortality of the Soul

On immortality: Plotinus. Aristotle. Plotinus agrees with this in the Enneads, Book 4, Chapter 8, asserting that the principles of reality can be made clear to the souls of the wise. Aristotle also, in his mystic philosophy Likely referring to the Theology of Aristotle, a Neoplatonic text attributed to Aristotle in the Renaissance that discussed Egyptian wisdom. concerning the mind of the Egyptians, says: a soul purified from every vice knows the first principles. For this reason, in the Ethics, Book 6, Chapter 14 In modern numbering, likely Book 6, Chapter 11., he says we should believe the experienced and the elderly, and the opinions of the prudent, no less than we believe formal proofs, even if they speak without a demonstration. And in the first book of On the Heavens, text 22: "Faith is close to the truth, and to the wise as well"; therefore, they are to be believed even when they speak without formal demonstration.

Plato. Plato says the very same thing in his Timaeus. Therefore, since many men of the highest talent and most eloquent character have approved of this matter concerning the immortality of the soul, no one should doubt that it must be accepted and held as something entirely investigated and approved by demonstrations. But

Argument 1. someone might object that Aristotle, in the first book of On the Soul, text 13, demonstrates that the soul is corruptible Subject to decay or death. through its corruptible effects; for corruptible effects come from a corruptible cause. Such effects include understanding, hating, feeling anger, and things of that kind. Therefore,

2. this is not a demonstrative problem A scientific question that can be proven with absolute certainty., but rather a topical one A matter of probability or dialectical debate rather than certain proof.. Furthermore, every single thing ought to be known according to its own nature, as stated in Metaphysics, Book 2, text 16: things must indeed be known according to their own essence or nature. But for the soul to be immortal is an article of faith; and an article of faith is known by revelation, and not by demonstration. Therefore, that which was

3. stated before [is the case]. The same is evident through Plato in the first book of the Laws, where he says that the inquiry into and knowledge of truth belongs to God alone. Certainly, it is necessary that these means by which the soul's immortality is proven be perceived by some light. But the true light is God himself: therefore, some men, illuminated by his light, have arrived at the immortality of the soul. Therefore, since immortality of this kind is acquired by the light of faith, it is not held through demonstration. To

Response. these things it can be said—and indeed to the first argument—that "understanding" does not belong to the soul alone in the way it understands now, but to the whole "composite" The human being as a union of body and soul.. The philosopher [Aristotle] says in the first book of On the Soul, text 64: to say the soul is angry is similar to saying the soul weaves or builds. For although the effects are corruptible because they are "organic" Dependent on physical organs like the brain or eyes., the soul itself is nonetheless not corrupted, because it is not organic, as I have said. Likewise, in the first book of the Posterior Analytics,

Means of demonstration. Aristotle says in text 95 that the means of knowledge is the effect, from which one arrives at the knowledge of the cause; and this kind of process is demonstrative. Truly, when he says in On the Soul, Book 3, text 67: "The intellect is in potentiality to all things," it follows that it is none of those things which it understands. But the things it understands are mortal, because they exist in matter, which is the cause of corruption; therefore, the intellect itself is "unmixed." Otherwise, it would be [physically] hot or cold, and thus organic, and subject to corruption. Furthermore, if he knew from its operation that the sense is corrupted by a strong sensory object, but the intellect is perfected by an excellent intelligible object—for instance, from the

Argument 1. knowledge of God and the intelligences Purely spiritual beings or angels that move the celestial spheres in ancient cosmology.—then just as he demonstrated the corruption of the senses, so he also demonstrated the immortality of the soul. Likewise, if this problem were merely "topical," then all books written about the soul would be merely topical. For if this question about the intellect is uncertain, then we would have nothing certain regarding the intellect itself. But the "genus" The general category or essence. of the intellect is the genus of all souls: therefore, every kind of soul would be a matter of doubt, and thus the entire science of the soul would be problematic. Indeed, if the genus is problematic, its species will

2. behave similarly, which is false. Likewise, Aristotle arrived at the knowledge of the First Mover through eternal motion, and at the knowledge of primary matter through eternal generation and corruption. Therefore, to reach a knowledge of the cause through a knowledge of the effects is a demonstrative method. Therefore, he who is able to reach the soul's immortality through its effects and operations, which are known to us, proceeds without a doubt demonstratively and not topically. Otherwise, all natural philosophy would be topical and in no way demonstrative, since it strives to investigate and find the cause through the effect. It is, therefore, a demonstrative problem.