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Wagner, Bernhard; Silberrad, Johann Paul · 1688

(γ) On Subtlety, Exercise 249, f. 3.
(δ) Partition of Metaphysics, book 2, q. 1.
(ε) Disp. 35, ch. 2, n. 3.
akurologein? to speak improperly/inaccurately
(γ), the thing itself cannot receive infinity. With these words he responds to the objection of those who say that from the fact that it is most probable that God created angels because they contribute both to the perfection of the whole world and approach very closely to the likeness of the Creator himself, it follows that an infinite and infinitely perfect substance is most possible, for this is most similar to God. But nothing can be equal to the infinite. Jacobus Martini is correct ($δ$), indeed, he says, if one is not ashamed to akurologein speak inaccurately, there is more of an immaterial nature given than a material one. For the efficient cause intends to assimilate the effect to itself, which, since it is spiritual, is the more immaterial the more it proceeds from it. The philosophy of Suarez excellently agrees with this ($ε$).
(ζ) in Sacred Philosophy, ch. 13.
Into the count of those arguments that possess the force of necessary proof, we refer first to that well-known one, although interpolated by many, which is taken from the possessed and the energumens, who produce various actions far exceeding their own powers, and which cannot draw their origin from any internal principle, such as: the tearing apart of iron chains, the use of foreign languages which they had never learned—usually joined with blasphemy—the revelation of hidden things, the prediction of future events, and other things of this kind. Therefore, they must have inhabitants with more eminent Natures or substances, by whom they know future things and who perform through them many things surpassing human powers, and afflict men with the greatest torments. Hence Fr. Vallesius rightly says ($ζ$):
Since so many things have been disputed by philosophers concerning Demons, I do not see why anyone, however rigid a philosopher he may wish to be, should take Demons out of the middle, and judge that they have no part in the cause of exciting diseases and tormenting bodies.
However, that all those things which have just been said cannot be done by man himself, instructed only by his own powers, can be evident to anyone; since, to say something about the speaking of foreign languages alone, it must be presupposed that the man was previously entirely ignorant of that idiom in which he now speaks perfectly. Examples of this matter...