Legal Dissertation on the Abstinence of Natural Law from the Fallacious Rules of the Putative Summary Process

§. 18. Let these things suffice regarding the examination of those things which are said to be of natural law in processes. We must now also see in what way those things which pertain to the essentials in the aforementioned manner, or could even be numbered among the savings legal defenses, do not clearly constitute a true and genuine difference between an ordinary and a summary process, according to the manner in which they are commonly treated. For when it is said that instead of a formal libel the written statement of a plaintiff's claim, some narration of the fact is desired; instead of the contestation of the suit, some response; instead of proof, a designation, Bescheinigung certification/proof (which, however, is rarely obtained), and so on, this differs only in terms, not in the thing itself. For even in those places where the examination of the formal libel is not inquired into so curiously and one hardly hears of an example or case in twenty years where a pronouncement was made against an inept libel, and in Saxony, where an interlocutory a provisional order is ready daily in trials, "that the lawsuit, as it was brought, has no standing," and where the defendant does not contest the suit affirmatively or negatively to each individual head of the libel precisely, but denies the narrated events as they are narrated, or at least indicates to the judge through indirection and exception how far he denies or does not, or believes the actor plaintiff is founded or not—the processes are nevertheless equally long. Therefore, this reason for constituting a difference fails, and it is clear that the vice of longevity lies elsewhere, both in that process and in the common process, as will be evident from what follows. The whole process can be distinguished into four principal classes, which it is of great interest to have observed properly in reporting acts and regarding the state of the case to be formed. The first contains those things which are judged regarding the contestation of the suit, and up to it, and dilatory matters procedural delays, until an end is imposed on those questions by some judgment. The second class treats those things which are performed from this interlocutory up to the final sentence, and they consist primarily in proof, the roll of witnesses, exceptions formed thereupon, deductions, and so on. The third class pertains to those things which are treated, with suspensive remedies applied, regarding the examination of grievances and their relevance. And finally, the fourth exhibits the execution itself, and what occurs in it, regarding the liquid clear debt or what is to be liquidated, or other competent matters, likewise