Legal Dissertation on the Abstinence of Natural Law from the Fallacious Rules of the Putative Summary Process

since the courts themselves are already established in such a way that, because of the mercenary offices of the judges, they can change nothing by virtue of their office. From this, the parties, by replying and duplicating on so many questions—where often the merits of the case themselves are mixed in in a vain way because proof was not made—dispute for the most part, and await a decree. And who is ignorant of those infinite questions which are accustomed to occur regarding the contestation of the suit itself or some response to it, whereby they can differ from one another in the effect of constituting a summary process? Whether one responds generally or in some way or specifically or point by point; whether this is done doubtfully or captiously; whether positions legal assertions are employed with this intent; and how an oath is to be added to them; how one is to respond by means of an oath; whether in writing or orally; whether in person or by proxy; and how in this case the response is to be entered verbatim into the mandate; likewise regarding the interlocutory to be made thereupon.

§. 21. And finally, after all these things have been acted out to the point of nausea and a sentence has been passed, if anyone thinks themselves burdened in so many incidental causes, suspensive remedies are applied, either before the same judge or by appealing to a higher judge. These also last for at least a year and more, even if it is such a cause that rejects an appeal. For it is also disputed and pronounced upon regarding the rejection, and often in this case it is admitted against the rules themselves, provided that the thing is in some way doubtful, because of the likewise fallacious rule that no one should complain that they were not sufficiently heard, and in doubt, for the defendant, or for the one who is in a state of defense, to which those remedies are supposed to pertain, and thus are supposed to be of divine law. Not to mention the many questions occurring regarding procurators legal representatives and concerning the legitimation of both the person and the cause, which, not being sufficiently decided beforehand and the procurator’s mandate or the instrument of the syndicate a formal authorization for representation as the case arises, or the tutory or curatory guardianship papers not having been accurately examined, where another interlocutory is also accustomed to intervene if the principal does not want to ratify the matter, a new process must be started again, and so regarding the rest, which cannot but be most miserable processes, infallible signs—