Legal Dissertation on the Abstinence of Natural Law from the Fallacious Rules of the Putative Summary Process

in such a way that just as no evil or misfortune is accustomed to be alone, so it must also be said of the process that no process is alone, but in each one several others occur, and the sentence is conspicuous by separate investigation.

§. 22. In the second class, or chapter of the process, namely, those things which are carried out from the sentence and judgment on the contestation of the suit up to the final sentence, many things also occur which are not avoided in a summary process, nor can they be avoided by a process so directed and instituted, and thus they bear witness against the fallacious rules of difference. For although regarding the probatory term the time period allowed for gathering evidence, and what are the strict offices of the producer and the produced, as also the reproducer and the reproduced, and some things are limited regarding desertion, which either do not bind so tightly in a summary process, or even compel one more tightly to form it, nevertheless these are all not the cause that the thing becomes long-lasting. For it is not those times which could easily be granted and are fatal that effect this, but rather they promote promptness, and the agents would be fortunate if one always proceeded in such a way. For whether they are shorter or extended to some weeks would not matter much to the thing. For the question for us is not about weeks, but about entire years and their loss. But indeed there are so many other things which are admitted here in vain regarding the order in proceeding and incidental questions, that—namely—the reproducer is not easily heard before the producer, when, however, if it were more often established regarding the truth of the exceptions, especially those that directly remove the action, the cause of the plaintiff would be useless, nor would the question remain whether the action is true, but whether it was also elicited through the proof of exceptions, and then so many difficulties regarding articles points of fact or law to be proved and their admissibility, relevance, or impertinence, as also against the persons of the witnesses, come into the middle before they are heard. All of which are useless, and the judge, from his office and the nature of the business, could very easily—nay, ought to—know whether they should be attended to or not, especially since these, if they are once warned or even not warned, do not pertain to the question of fact but of law, and thus to look at those or