Legal Dissertation on the Abstinence of Natural Law from the Fallacious Rules of the Putative Summary Process

are for the most part more like the form of writing treatises, when, however, the extreme office of the judge or the reporter lies more in this, that he reads and re-reads the documents and the statements of witnesses, than in those empty things which the parties philosophize about thereupon, containing primarily the application of law, which is to be repeated as the office of the judge.

§. 24. In the third class, namely, that which is attended to after the first final sentence in the following instance regarding suspensive remedies, containing the most vulgar rules promulgated regarding that process of Leuteration a specific form of appeal, restitution, supplication, or finally appeal, let them be witnesses of their own uselessness, so much so that we do not fear to assert that, in effect, that time which is commonly attributed to absolving those instances hardly ever suffices, even if the question is regarding the rejection of an appeal, positing also that this is rejected in effect, what shall we say if it is deferred to itself, and is treated through its fatal consequences and steps and incidents? Of which thing, there is no other cause than that the burdened party is not alone, but the other party is also heard, lest he be undefended against the law of nature, as we demonstrated above, and precisely for this reason the uselessness of this controversy can appear, because the controversy supposes the cause of the fact to be controversial and doubtful, here, however, there is a question only regarding the doubts of the burdened party, consisting in this, whether the law was duly applied or not, and thus the application made is to be corrected. Let the fourth class now come forth, observing those things which are treated and come to be deduced regarding execution in judgment, and regarding this, indeed, at first glance it could appear as if when the matter is brought to it, as if regarding the end of the process and the conclusion of the whole thing, one must not believe and feel otherwise, except that every end is pleasant, and thus the plaintiff is to be compared to a sailor, "who with the sails of the ship spread, calls upon the lord of the sea so that he may give wind to the stern, while having crossed the course of the sea he arrives in port, as Basil of Seleucia, Orat. 15." But it seems more true to us, the judgment of some expert practitioner, feeling that "the process, when it has been reduced to the terms of execution, has then at last arrived only to the half." For, to pass over the mode of proceeding in the execution itself, regarding