Legal Dissertation on the Abstinence of Natural Law from the Fallacious Rules of the Putative Summary Process

movables, and especially immovables, sequestration, subhastation auctioning/public sale, or the estimation of places elsewhere, and adjudication in payment—for it is not our task to recount the whole order of the process, but at least insofar as this here removes the difference of the summary [process] through conspicuous longevity, which flees from it thereupon? How many remedies compete against the execution itself and exceptions, then how the question of forming the liquid the clear amount of debt succeeds, or excess in the execution itself, so that it is often convenient to recount this matter to a new process; nay, cases are present where after seventy years, as seventy perverse interpreters of the process, a new state of the case regarding the liquid—that is, what and how much is owed—is formed, where it is also to be warned that often a third party pretends some right in the thing which is in execution, which question is then also to be determined.

§. 25. It will be helpful to have said this much regarding the rules confusing summary processes; let us see now also regarding some causes in particular, and the uselessness of the remedies called into subsidy, and working for nothing. And before all, indeed, the summary possessory process could be opposed—for who, in the force of arguing against us, would flee it? That this process is finished by momentary questions, and that neither exceptions of deeper investigation nor suspensive remedies are admitted, and that only the question "whether not, truly how" a distinction between the fact of possession and the manner of it is defined. But indeed these things all bring nothing to our matter. For by the very fact that only the question of fact—and indeed of mere fact, whether one possesses—is treated, it is clear that this matter does not pertain to the true process, as it is where the law is applied to the fact, which does not properly happen in this place, but rather, at least for the interim, the possessor is looked after so that he may be secure in the future process, and thus it is not the process itself but its entrance, handing down its preliminaries—regarding which thing see the entire dissertation of the Illustrious Lord de Cocceji, "On that which is of mere fact." In an ordinary possessory [process], however, suspensive remedies and the rest are admitted, as is vulgar. It is hardly to be denied that the executive process can no longer be easily numbered among the summary [processes] today, even if here too, especially, so many benefits