[Vocabularius utriusque iuris] (1473) - Page 21

rebus original: "rebus q̃s saluas fore recēperūt" which they received to be kept safe. Digest, On the shipmaster, cau cauponibus, sta stabulariis, book 1, in the present, r rescript, paragraph "Likewise", through the opom opinion of the scholars, r rescript, law 1. And thus in the same paragraph; and the speaker says "joining", law, final, paragraph "is". The action is of the same type, and Digest, On theft, adū adversus, nau nautam, cau cauponem, stab stabularium, book 1, r rescript, and Institutes, On obligations which arise from malfeasance, law 1, paragraph "Item, regarding exercise".

¶ Action in personam is called a condition when you say that it is incumbent upon someone to give or do something for you. But when you sue so that your thing may be restored to you, it takes a special name; and in deposit it is called simply a personal action and not a condition. This name "condition" derived from the fact that formerly legal proceedings were ordinary and had certain words that one had to "condict," that is, say together; as if anyone fell from the sentence, they fell from the whole case. But afterwards those solemnities fell into disuse, yet the name remained, so that even now personal actions which were interpreted by solemn words are called conditions. And these are gathered in the Institutes, On actions, paragraph "We call", with the notes there; Digest, On the same title, law "Types of actions". And of these types of actions, some arise from contract, some from quasi-contract, some from malfeasance and quasi-malfeasance. Institutes, On obligations, paragraph "See", and On actions, paragraph "All". Seek elsewhere regarding all these in the section "Actions from contract".

¶ Action in rem is called the vindication of a thing, that is, when you say that the thing about which the case is concerned is yours, and the adversary says or shows that the thing itself is his own. Digest, On actions and obligations, law "Types of actions", and Institutes, On the same title, paragraph "We call", in the end. And of these actions, one is a direct action in rem, such as the vindication of a thing, the confessory action, and the negatory action. Another is a useful action in rem, which are actions concerning ownership not directly but usefully, which are given from equity at times to non-owners, as are the publicianae Publician actions, which compete from adverse causes. And the action through which it is sought whether the actor has sworn, and the action in rem on superficie surface rights, and the faviana Favian and pauliana Paulian and calvisiana Calvisian actions, and the action in rem which competes between the owners of tablets and painters. There are also other actions in rem in which one does not sue for ownership but for pledges, such as the serviana Servian and quasi-serviana quasi-Servian, about which see in their own place. And note that a personal action does not follow the land, Digest, On contracting, emp

and purchase, law "Less", paragraph "Lucius Titius", Digest, To Trebatius, law 1, paragraph "If hatred", Digest, On judgment, law "Fideicommissum", paragraph "Treaty", Code, On servitude, law 2, paragraph "Likewise", and Digest, On alien judgment, much, cause, do, law 3, paragraph "Work" in the gloss, by the divine [Augustus] in the final law, Digest, On the announcement of new work. Also, a personal action is so affixed to the bones of the creditor that it cannot be transferred to another except by a fiction of law, Digest, On precarium a grant for use at the grantor's pleasure, law "Final, if anyone".

¶ Action for injuries competes for him who has suffered an injury, as noted in the Institutes, On injuries, in the rubric against him who inflicted the injury or procured it to be inflicted. Institutes, same title, paragraph "Not only". And he struck or beat, or wrote a defamatory poem to the disgrace of another, or in any way afflicted someone with an injury. Institutes, same title, paragraph "Injury", in which the judge condemned if the actor previously swore that he did not wish to have sustained that injury, in the estimation of the judge. Institutes, same title, paragraph "Penalty", and Digest, same title, law "These things, the goods". For some say that he ought rather to swear that he had lost so much, or that he had sustained such an injury. And this is seen to be approved by Hostiensis a 13th-century canonist, in his history, On injury and damages given, and Speculum The Mirror of Law, same title. Others say that it is sufficient for him to swear that he would not wish to gain so much or so much for the fact that he sustained or would have sustained such an injury. For the first seems truer, and an action for injuries does not arise from contract but from contumely. Law "If one", paragraph "But if contract", Digest, same title, where the text says that an action for injuries does not arise from contract but from contumely. And it is from good and equity and is abolished by dissimulation. For if anyone has left the injury, that is, if he did not recall it to mind immediately after suffering it, afterwards he will not be able to resume the injury which he has remitted from his mind. Law "Not only", paragraph 1, Digest, On injury. And it is given neither to an heir nor against heirs. Law "Action for injuries, etc.", same title, Digest.

¶ Institorial action, according to Azo, is given to him who contracted with someone in that business for which he was placed, against him who placed a manager in a shop or business, managing it by those contracting with the one placed, whether the placing was express or tacit. As in Digest, On the institorial action, law 1 and 2, and law "Says", paragraph "Not therefore", with the notes there. And it is called institoria from institor, a manager from the manager placed, just as the exercitoria shipmaster's action is named from the placer. Institutes, "That with him", paragraph "Exercitoria" and the following paragraph. For a manager