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there, not throughout. In the chapter Licet, on elections, in the sixth book, under the word lacking, as noted by Innocent IV in the chapter Litteras. To the contrary, it seems that where a bishop performs an act, or a superior with the cognizance of a cause, it appears that he dispenses regarding such an act, provided that he does not expressly dispense, as it seems not in the notes of the Master of the School in the chapter Venerabilis, on the sons of priests, for since the bishop knows the person is ineligible for the act to which he admits the person, it appears he enables [them] for such an act. According to the law Item Ulpianus, on the execution of a sentence, on the matter adjudged, in the law Quidam consulebant, on possession of goods, in the law Servus si messis, note the manner [of] saying, in law 1, paragraph Si. Regarding which, note in the chapter Pastoris, above under the word Ex certa scientia, on the office of the delegate, and this was the common opinion in the Rota. And it does not obstruct the point because there was an act that was done without cognizance of the cause. Item, provided that there they expressed another benefice, it does not appear that from the part it deserves to be a beneficed cure, and therefore there the clause notwithstanding cannot work a dispensation.
Note that where three sentences are given regarding one matter, but the last sentence is given regarding the desertion of an appeal, and only the appeal is pronounced deserted, that in this case the sentences are discordant, because two are confirmatory [and] the other is regarding the desertion. In this case, the chapter In bonis sententiis, on the matter adjudged, does not have a place, by which it is seen that to whom the cause of nullity is omitted, one can inhibit that the execution not be done. For that chapter has a place when three sentences are given uniformly and in everything it is consistent regarding the instance of the father, which is not the case here when the last sentence is given regarding desertion. Although against this seems the law Furti, in the beginning, in the Digest on those who do not act, where when it is pronounced regarding desertion from the time of the first sentence, it has effect; where, however, it is confirmed by sentence, from the time of the confirmation it has force, not however from the time the sentence was given from which it was appealed, as there. Regarding the first part, note the points by Johannes Andreae in the chapter Licet, on pacts, in the Clementines, and see the decisions 165, 417, 311, 205, and 442, 443.
Note that where the ordinary or another superior has the power of nominating someone in his first creation, that he be received as a canon in a certain church of his bishopric, and such a first-nominated [person] accepts the grace as much as is in him, if however the said nominee renounces the grace made to him by nominating, he who nominated cannot nominate another. According to the law Apud Austrium, in the Digest on the operation of law, and that it is not, according to the Archdeacon in the chapter Cum in multis, above under the word Expects, in the beginning, and in the chapter Gratia, at the end, on the resignation of benefices, law 6, especially when the nominee is a cleric and an ecclesiastical person in whom such variation is not approved, as in the chapter Pastoralis, on the rights of patronage, and that it is not, according to Innocent IV in the chapter Cum Bertoldus, above under the word Bishop, on the matter adjudged, although he may live to the contrary.
[One from the family], in the beginning, with what is noted there, [and] such is not done by changing, and the chapter Si electio, on elections, book 6. But there, the election does not immediately have effect unless confirmation follows; collation, however, it has, showing to the nominee that, however, a bishop can nominate against the number established by custom, see that such a custom, since it is burdensome, is not valid, as in the chapter 1, on customs, with what is noted there by Johannes Andreae, and that it is not in the chapter Dilectus, under the word Constitutum, of the same title. See decision 35.
Note that where someone is in possession of some pension and proves that the pension was paid in past times, but it does not appear regarding the mandate of him to whom the pension is said to be owed, when it was paid, it is presumed that the payer had a mandate, because it is not likely that the payer wished to throw away his money, as in the law Eum, on undue payment, in the Digest on proof, because in such a case it is presumed that he who performs such an act acts by the mandate of the principal, according to Innocent IV in the chapter Nonnulli, above under the word Mandate, on the restitution of goods, and note by the Archdeacon in the chapter Statutum, in the section above under the word Chaplain, on the restitution of goods, book 6, especially when the pension is paid by him to whom it was said to be owed, because then he appears to ratify the payment, regarding the mandate given. According to the note in the chapter Ex parte, on the restitution of goods, by Innocent IV, and thus it follows that the parts, if he asks for such a pension to be restored, it is restored, because by such payment it is presumed that he was in possession unless the other is proven, although it may seem to the contrary, because the act of a third party ought not to harm another, as is said in the similar [case] that the act of an abbot does not harm the convent regarding transferring into another [person] the possession or ownership, extra on the restitution of goods, in the chapter Dilectus, with the note there by the gloss by Innocent IV.
Note that a process had with an excommunicate is valid, and this [is so] where [it is] if it be had before the ordinary, otherwise if before a delegate, of which speak according to Johannes Andreae and the Archdeacon in the chapter 1, on the restitution of goods, book 6, and in the chapter Pia, on exceptions, because the ordinary jurisdiction is favorable, the other is strict and extraordinary, as in the chapter Praenotandum, on the office of the delegate, but the palace holds that a process had before an auditor holds in this case just as it holds before the ordinary. And understand [this] regarding a public excommunicate; otherwise, it is different, as in the chapter Ad probandum, on judgments.
Note that where tithes are sought from someone and it is said the same debtor ceased from the payment of past time, unless he shows that the tithes were sought, the debtor is not held except from the time of the petition, because to predial tithes one is not