deceit is proven. ¶ Also, he who obtains letters regarding that upon which he appealed ought to make mention of his appeal. ¶ Also, whatever is done after his appeal or that of another must be revoked to its former state. ¶ Also, he who does not pursue an appeal ought to be condemned to the expenses of the other party.

Having inquired

Case: Sometimes the Pope commits a cause
to two or three judges with this clause: "If both or three of you cannot proceed in the cause, one of you may proceed." If all cannot be present, two of them may proceed in the cause. It was asked regarding what kind of inability this is understood. The Pope replies that this inability is understood both by law and by fact. By law, if any of them is a slave or infamous or detained by another similar impediment, for example, if he were excommunicated or removed or suspected. By fact, such as if one of them has died or is detained by an inevitable impediment; and then he ought to signify the cause to his co-judges so that they may proceed in the business committed to them. But if any of them merely does not wish to be present, he is not excused for this reason from not having to be present with the others unless it were said in the rescript: "If you cannot or do not wish to be present all together in the cause." ¶ Note here that a slave and an infamous person cannot be judges; an infamous person, however, can be an arbiter. ¶ Also note that judges cannot proceed without their co-judge if he does not excuse himself. ¶ Also, the word of impossibility does not void the word of will.

Pastoral

In the first part, such a case is posited: someone
obtained letters against his adversary regarding some cause to certain judges. After the citation or at least the presentation, the other party afterwards obtained the same cause to be delegated to other judges, and in the second letters, mention was made of the aforementioned. It was opposed that they were obtained through false suggestion and suppression of the truth. It is doubted whether the first letters were revoked by the second, and it is asked whether the first judges or the subsequent ones ought to take cognizance of this revocation. It is replied that if the first judges wish to defer to the subsequent ones, or the subsequent ones to the first, then all should take cognizance together. And if by chance they all cannot agree on one sentence together because there are more judges in one commission than in the other, let this doubt be determined by arbiters commonly elected. Secondly, such a question is formed: whenever letters are obtained under this form, "Take cognizance, Titius, of Peter and certain others regarding tithes and other things." It is asked whether the judge from such a delegation has jurisdiction over persons or things not comprehended by that clause, "certain others and other things," before the persons or things are expressed in the judgment. Before he solves that question, he submits another that arises from the second, which is such: someone regarding those things by which he could be convened through that clause, "certain others and other things," obtained letters in his own name against the first petitioner of the general letters, designating a certain thing which was included through that clause "and other things," with no mention made of the previous omission. It is asked whether the second letters are valid, since they made no mention of the aforementioned, nor were the person or thing yet expressed in the judgment. The Pope replies to these two, first to the second, saying that since a special mandate derogates from a general one, the jurisdiction attributed through general letters is first weakened by special letters insofar as those things are specifically expressed in the second letters.