[Decretales]

In receiving the prebend a church office providing income, if you ought to have preferred him to yourself, you could not have commanded the execution of the precept. Since, therefore, the aforementioned person demanded this of you in your presence, you replied that you had received no such mandate. And thus, having finished the business, you sent back what you ought not to have done in any way, if you had attended with diligence to the date of the letters, and at the time when those same letters were given, you were from that very chapter; for you were the archidiaconus archdeacon in the canonica canonical residence of that same church, and you had not yet been consecrated as episcopus bishop. Further, you ought not to disdain him because he is a Iudeus Jew.

On Ulcerations, to the Bishop of Lincoln.

It has come to our ears that many decani deans, archpriests, or others presiding over ecclesiastical dignities, when obtaining letters regarding lesser beneficia benefices/church livings, often suppress the dignities of their titles, for they call themselves by a simple name, as if they did not possess any personatus status of holding an office. Since it is not our intention that...

u But to you. He was writing to you the reader while the cathedral was vacant.

a On the offices of Christ. Here the Pope draws from the following honest behavior, as is clear in an ancient prelatio preferment... The rest of this marginal note discusses legal precedents for presuming intent based on preceding or subsequent conduct, citing canonical authorities regarding the reputation and life of the individual.

u Since a donation. He was well-alleging what he did not have the power to give.

r To the bishop. If the Supreme Pope were to grant a beneficium benefice to someone and command that the bishop receive him, then the letters are valid and the bishop ought to receive him. And conversely, if the collation belongs to the chapter, it should not be written to the bishop.

b Concerning the deed. The bishop was not required by necessity to receive this person at the mandate of the letters, though he ought to have received him for the sake of honesty; however, he is reprimanded because he said he did not receive him according to the mandate. It is gathered that he is not held to confer the benefit, or say that he is well held to receive what is to confer a prebend, as appears from the form of the mandate.

c You ought. An argument that one should act with others; if the opportunity presents itself, he should act alone. Thus, he alone can amend, even if he did poorly with others. The remainder of this margin discusses the delegation of authority, the limitations of mandates to successors, and the role of the bishop as the head of the chapter.

d Date of the letters. To this, it should be noted concerning the date of the letters that it must be considered... Discusses the proper scrutiny of legal documents, the necessity of presenting all documents in court, and the obligations of parties regarding the production of instruments.

e Jew. Because the church was founded by a Jewish boy.

f To the ears. Those obtaining letters without a special mandate of the Lord [Pope] are not valid for lawsuits.

g Intention. It is clear that the Pope grants a beneficium benefice in such a way that it does not harm another or, at least, not gravely or enormously.

h Suppresses. He who suppresses what he is bound to reveal ought to be punished.

i We do not wish to obtain. Seeing that these letters are not valid, if he obtains them through such letters, it is noted on this matter elsewhere.

l By deceit or negligence. It is presumed by deceit or negligence if they stood for a year without using the letters.

l To be excused. He cannot except, because of his own fault, that he is not held to answer by the second letters. But the contrary seems to be the case if the second letters do not mention the first; the first are valid because he could except... Legal discussion on the nature of 'perpetual' versus 'temporal' exceptions in canon law.

...abounding in many revenues, disturb poor clerics over lesser beneficia benefices through our letters, and in the letters they suppress the name of their own dignity, we do not wish them to have force.

The Same to the Bishop of Novicens.

If anyone, by authority of later letters, has objected in court that he has prior letters of which no mention is made in the later ones, if he can be excused by deceit or negligence for having used the latter, he should not be denied. If, however, he could not obtain a copy from the delegated judge, then he cannot be denied because of the later letters.

¶ If the sum ¶ It must be reached.

It has been signified to us that certain people in your province, as they assert, have received letters from our chancery by which they commit all their business to the arbitration of one judge or many whom they have chosen for themselves. Thus it happens that if they wish to strike at someone, they do not require the examination of the ordinary judge, but [go] to one or several judges...

m To be required. And this is to say that if the first do not stand, the prior is to be presumed.

m To have. He delayed in using them.

n We are. All business; such excessive generality is reprobated here. This margin argues against 'excessive generality' in legal mandates, stating that jurisdiction cannot be entirely stripped from the ordinary judge by vague commissions.

o They chose. That is, they chose while existing in the curia so that the verb is in the past, subjunctive mood. Because they did not want to say that these letters were directed to uncertain judges whom the Emperor would have to define, saying that a general commission of cases could be made provided that the judges were certain. The final portion of the margin provides a detailed canon-legal analysis of why 'general commissions' of all business to 'uncertain judges' are invalid, as they would effectively absorb the jurisdiction of the ordinary office.