[Decretales]

a Impediment. Pure, because he is excommunicated or illiterate, nor does he have the custom of cases. Because a judge must be skilled, nor should he ask others what he ought to say. Yet if he is illiterate but has the custom of cases or skill in judging, a case can be committed to him. And certain impediments are placed [in the title on impediments]. Also, if the impediment is perpetual, it can be in many ways, such as infirmity, deafness, etc. Regarding what is said about "infamy," it is said that it has a place only in a delegated judge, because an ordinary judge is removed only by excommunication.

If it is established that he has fallen into the case of death, or is hindered by a moment of incurable necessity, so that he cannot be present, provided that he who cannot be present by reason of necessity takes care to provide his canonical excuses to his colleagues if he is able to designate [others], so that the other judges or executors may nevertheless proceed to the summary execution of the enjoined mandate. For that person who simply does not wish to be present cannot be excused in any way by this interpretation of impossibility, unless perhaps it is expressed in the rescript: "if all are not present, or cannot or will not be present together." ¶ Inn. III.

b Designate. By letters or by a certain messenger attested by letter. This is canonical designation. But is it valid for him who cannot be present to delegate his duties to another?

c To the summary execution. As in the chapter "With the beloved."

d Proceed. Which they can indeed do if there is that clause in the letters of commission: "if not all." Otherwise, they cannot proceed.

e Excused. Rather, he should be punished. If it is established that he does not want to be present, this contradicts the other [decree] that corrects this.

f Present. Today, even if this is not added, if he is unwilling, others may proceed, even though he is to be argued against for neglecting to execute the apostolic mandate.

Pastoral duty [is] elicited for the bishop.

g Pastoral. Ambiguous. But I ask, how?

Moreover. Paragraph: "If indeed," regarding the revocation of letters, it is doubted whether the prior judges or the later ones should acknowledge it, or whether the first letters were revoked by the later ones. To which [it is] answered: that unless the later ones say so, or vice versa, they should both acknowledge it together, and if by chance they cannot agree on one sentence, if there are more on one side than the other, it should be resolved by arbiters.

h Sopitae. When, however, under such a form, the causes that such a person proposes against such a person and certain others regarding this and certain other things are brought before you, we have decided that they should be committed. Since many have obtained letters, we have carefully asked whether a judge, in such a delegation, before the expression of the person or the matter, has power over the persons or matters to be expressed, adding: whether, if persons or matters were not expressed, it should be noted regarding the non-expressed [matters] in the first petition, or if general letters were obtained which make no mention of the prior omission, whether they should obtain the same force [when sent] to other judges by apostolic authority. We therefore answer these two things: that since the general is without doubt derogated by the special, the jurisdiction that was attributed by the general letters is entirely overturned by the special as regards those things which are specially expressed; [and as to] whether the letters make mention of the priors, the first question is left as superfluous.

e. The chapter of the Holy Cross. But certainly according to him, one does not revoke the other, since neither is prior to the other. Rather, according to the common [opinion], both letters are deemed to have been made or the first [is superior]. The third says that it can be doubted whether they are revoked, such as if the second makes mention of the first, although not explicitly. And this is not true; as can be said from that decree "From the letters," this could be the reason for this decree. Since different letters are obtained, judges and parties [meet]...

They do not wish to acknowledge [the first letters]... the first letters should be acknowledged since the exception was raised before them... and you should explain that they doubt the revocation... it is better to say that it becomes clear that by this solution, the judge can well doubt the renunciation of the letters, although the second [letters] make express mention of the first; but when it is objected that the second letters were obtained by false suggestion or suppression of the truth, then it is better [to proceed as in] the title on the office of the delegate, "Before"... and this is the truer understanding. But this doubt regarding the revocation of letters does not have a place in letters of appeal and principal matters, because the judges of the appeal ought to know about this.

i Mission. By that, that is...

k To be deferred. By consent of the parties.

l More. This does not stand by the judgment of the greater part, and the same for the right of the proxy, as was done in the case of the bishop. But in judges delegated by the Prince, if they dissent, the judgment of the greater number of creditors stands... Also, for another reason: these three judges would be suspected by themselves, because they would seem to be conducting their own affairs, as if they were abdicating their jurisdiction and wishing to remove it from themselves, which should not be. And thus to the three arbiters. But although in the first letters and in the second there were the same judges in number, it could be said that the judgment of the greater part will stand, because the jurisdiction and power appear greater on one side than on the other.