But if another says he was a lawfully constituted procurator, then he is bound to prove the mandate, because many pretend to be others under the name of others to obtain letters, and unless he teaches of the mandate, he ought not to be heard, as is said here. In the case of appeal, the same Io. said that he is not bound to prove the mandate, because it is not to be believed that anyone would neglect his own right in pursuing an appeal, which is the act of every diligent person. But if the letters are obtained by a simple letter, it is necessary to prove the special mandate. This constitution was not well observed, nor did judges admit such an exception. But certainly it ought well to be admitted that letters are not valid unless they are obtained by a procurator, and this is proven in the decretals of Gregory. I will say as I say there. I believe it is otherwise in letters concerning obtaining benefices, because there a mandate is not required since they are not obtained over any lawsuit, but proceed only from grace. But those are obtained over lawsuits already arisen and not future ones. The Roman curia is not accustomed to admit this exception of the mandate, nor ought we to admit it, and if it is appealed through this, letters would not be given by the king over this appeal.

a Must be erected. Which are the persons of the benefice...

To Honorius, Archbishop of Canterbury, and his co-judges.

they are not valid and he himself may be punished as a forger, unless perhaps he existed as one of those persons from whom a mandate ought not to be required by law.

Our beloved son, J. Sarracenus, cleric, has explained before us that when Jordanus, cleric of Dumelie, had dragged him into a case before you by the authority of our letters concerning the church of Saint Nicholas of Dufmelie, on the part of the same J., it was proposed by excepting that he could not be convened by the authority of those letters, because it was distant beyond two days' journey from the diocese where the aforesaid church was, against the statutes of the general council, of which no mention was made in the same letters. Because you, denying that you would admit such an exception, proceeded in the case because the same J. obtains benefices in the dioceses of Rochester and Ely, as if from this he were understood to have his domicile there, he appealed to our hearing. And since now the same J., having pursued the appeal interposed, had obtained letters to the Archbishop of York and his colleagues concerning the aforementioned, you, nonetheless proceeding in the case, forbade those same judges not to proceed in the business committed to them. Therefore, we command that if it is so, you cease from the cause, since not you but the said judges ought to know to whom the jurisdiction ought to pertain.

b Domicile. Here it is clear that although someone may have a benefice in a place or a church elsewhere, that for this reason he does not have a domicile there; for the sole possession of a house that one works in another city does not make a domicile. But one can truly have a domicile in several places, provided he appears to have placed himself equally in each. ... Or also where he sells, buys, contracts, and celebrates feast days. ... By reason of the thing about which it is treated, one can be reached... and from this he acquires the forum. And thus it is clear that these days' journey are always to be computed with respect to the diocese where the thing is about which one is convened, although he may have a benefice there or he may be found there, but in a personal action it is otherwise, because he can be reached wherever he has a domicile.

Domicile.

c You forbid. And wrongly, because after the case of the appeal is committed by certain knowledge, the jurisdiction of the [previous] judges is suspended. But the judge of the appeal can forbid the judge from whom the appeal was made not to proceed in the same case.

You forbid.

e But the said judges. For the judges of the appeal ought to know whether it was appealed legitimately, and if the appeal is legitimate, they themselves know; otherwise, they remit the parties to the prior judges, condemning the appellant in expenses. And thus the judges given for the appeal ought always to know of such jurisdiction, and not convene with the others, as I have sometimes seen done. That has a good place when diverse judges contend themselves to have jurisdiction principally.

But the said judges.

f Chapter. By this, that it was not concerning the same benefice but diverse others, it would not be said to be proposed. That if he seeks something else which is not the same, each of these had obtained that provision be made for him in a prebendal benefice, but not concerning the same, certainly these simple things, that nothing is the same, so it is. Mention not having been made. Through this it seemed that the letters were not valid. ... But first, there they had already been presented before the computation.

Chapter.

...secondly, and thus it does not contradict, but accords with this. And there concerning the same... and thus also it does not obstruct the chapter "Otherwise." Meaning the chapter of caution. Whence it seems that the sentence afterwards given did not hold. Below, on sentences, where it says "you have relaxed the sentences given," but there it says the reason that the sentence held. Or understand that it was appealed for a just cause, that perhaps they had received the letters of another or alleged another just cause, which thus did not hold as I said in the last note. Suspensions ... ...in the end where this is treated. ...judges ought to know to whom the jurisdiction ought to pertain.

Concerning him who is Archdeacon, legate.

The Apostle has shown by a petition exhibited to us that when Calimacus, cleric, was obtaining our letters to you, first monitorial, then preceptor, concerning obtaining a prebendal benefice in the church of the same, B., cleric, against them concerning conferring a like benefice in the same church, obtained executor letters from us to the Archdeacon of Ro. and his colleagues, without mention having been made of the strict law, which after the appeal interposed to us, they brought sentences of suspension and excommunication against them, and the said L. obtained our writings to others concerning the execution of the mandate done by them, who brought sentences of suspension and excommunication against those same ones. Therefore, we command that he, having been received as a canon and brother, having assigned to him the prebendal benefice, he who first brought the apostolic mandate to them, relax the aforesaid sentences according to the form of the church, imposing silence on the other concerning the prebendal benefice in the same church.

The same to the Archbishop of Bourges, legate of the apostolic see.

It has come to our hearing that certain clerics, abusing the apostolic...

l Relax. From this it appears that the sentence of suspension given after the appeal held, but it seems that the appeal held from the fact that he who first presented the letters ought to have provided, and not to him who had been thought to be the one against whom it was appealed. Say that the sentence held because the appeal did not hinder that he had not yet provided to anyone before those, and in the letters it was provided: "if you have not received another at our mandate." This is the clause "unless from our mandate this same church had been burdened in the reception of another," it was inserted in both letters as appears in the integrity. But they had not yet received, whence the appeal did not hold since it did not yet demand an exception. Or say if you see the aforesaid sentences, relax as a precaution as much as to that sentence which was given after the appeal which was legitimate as much as to the others given by Calimacus where the appeal did not proceed, he is held properly to relax that one. And thus properly and improperly together that is held. ... What if by the presentation made by one of those to the chapter, other judges after the appeal excommunicated? It seems that the appeal holds, because from the time the other was provided he had the right. Whence if the chapter appealed from the second presenter, it seems well that the appeal holds, because it ought to provide to him who presented first as is said here, and therefore absolved as a precaution.