The Necessity of Atheism

Every proof may be referred to one of these three divisions; we are naturally led to consider what arguments we receive from each of them to convince us of the existence of a Deity.

1st. The evidence of the senses: If the Deity should appear to us, if he should convince our senses of his existence, this revelation would necessarily command belief. Those to whom the Deity has thus appeared have the strongest possible conviction of his existence.

Reason claims the 2nd place. It is argued that man knows that whatever exists must either have had a beginning or have existed from all eternity. He also knows that whatever is not eternal must have had a cause. When this is applied to the existence of the universe, it is necessary to prove that it was created; until that is clearly demonstrated, we may reasonably suppose that it has endured from all eternity. In a case where two propositions are diametrically opposite, the mind believes that which is less incomprehensible. It is easier to suppose that the universe has existed from all eternity than to conceive of a being capable of creating it. If the mind sinks beneath the weight of one, is it an alleviation to increase the intolerability of the burden? The other argument, which is founded upon a man's knowledge of his own existence, stands thus: A man knows not only that he now exists, but that there was a time when he did not exist; consequently, there must have been a cause. But what does this prove? We can only infer from effects causes exactly adequate to those effects. There certainly is a generative power that is influenced by particular instruments; we cannot prove that it is inherent in these instruments, nor is the contrary hypothesis capable of demonstration. We admit that the generative power is incomprehensible, but to suppose that the same effect is produced by an eternal, omniscient Almighty Being leaves the cause in the same obscurity but renders it more incomprehensible.

The 3rd and last degree of assent is claimed by testimony; it is required that it should not be contrary to reason. The testimony that the Deity convinces the senses of men of his existence can only be admitted by us if our mind considers it less probable that these men should have been deceived than that the Deity should have appeared to them. Our reason can never admit the testimony of men who not only declare that they were eyewitnesses of miracles, but that the Deity was irrational—for he commanded that he should be believed and proposed the highest rewards for faith and eternal punishments for disbelief. We can only command voluntary actions; belief is not an act of volition, for the mind is even passive. From this it is evident that we do not have sufficient testimony, or rather that testimony is insufficient to prove the being of a God. We have before shown that it cannot be deduced from reason; they who have been convinced by the evidence of the senses—they only can believe it.