Rudimenta artium dialecticae et rhetoricae

R V D I M E N T A

that term, Animal, is broader and more common than man is: for it embraces, besides man, any other living creatures. Now, narrower terms ought to be explained through more common ones: as is done here in the definition of man: where man is the species, and animal is its genus. Furthermore, the difference of man, by which he differs from other related species, that is, from the remaining living creatures, is the very reason and mind implanted in man by God. The property, truly, of man, is that he can speak. The accident is that he walks with an erect body.

Let us also take another example from the predicament of quality.

Justice is a virtue, giving to each his own. First, Justice is a term of the Predicament of quality. For it is referred to this as its own proper order. For it is indeed a virtue, a quality of the mind, as is established. Therefore, the genus of Justice, when it is defined, will be quality if you look at the higher genus: but if the lower and closer one, virtue: which term is broader and more common: since justice is a species of virtue. The differing part, however,

The margin text here is fragmented and largely illegible due to layout damage, primarily repeating keywords like "cognate," "justice," and "virtue."

is, to give to each his own: by which it is distinguished and separated from cognate forms, prudence and temperance: which themselves are also virtues, no less than Justice, as far as their common genus is concerned.

The rationale of defining is similar for any other things and terms whatsoever: whose genera, and differences, and the rest, the science of Predicables and Predicaments easily provides for us. This concerning Definition.