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ARISTOTLE
ON VIRTUES, BOOK I.
The philosopher utilizes in this book a method of dividing and defining, which is called diairetike divisive and horistike definitive: and so, he takes his starting point from the higher differences and descends from these to the forms.
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The differences of these are praiseworthy because they are good, and they are so because of one another. The shameful are blameworthy. From the good things come the virtues; from the shameful things, the vices. They are praiseworthy because the same things are the objects of knowledge of the virtues: the things that follow upon the virtues, the things that arise from them, and the works themselves. Conversely, the opposites are blameworthy.
The forms,
Division of the virtues
according to the subject
in which they exist.
Since the soul is taken to be tripartite according to Plato, for the rational part the virtue is phronesis prudence. For the spirited part, it is both gentleness and courage. For the appetitive part—