V I T A.

Handwritten note in Latin: "The origin of studies"

Handwritten note in Latin: "or of study"

...which only argued about these precepts and sought no use for them, how thoroughly I knew them. Nor was I able to grasp this from those authors, since both explained the various arts of invention rather than their distinct use; neither explained the doctrine of judgment, but gathered many things under the name of disposition, so that they seemed to me to recite a partition they had heard rather than to declare one they had thoroughly perceived and known. A few years later, when that innate love of youthful persuasion constantly called me back to this, I devoted myself entirely to the Organon the body of Aristotle's logical works again; I observed it diligently; I explained it publicly, so as to impose a necessity of greater diligence upon myself; I even adorned it with false praises, which I then thought were true. And although I did not yet see any solid utility in the entire composition of the logical books, I did nevertheless detect something in certain parts. Therefore, I did not despair, but rather I curiously investigated all the books of all men that had been published on this art; I found many written in both Latin and Greek; one even in Hebrew from the more recent Hebrews. In all these, I found nothing but certain contracted sentences of this Organon-based logic; I did not find the path that would lead to its use. A few men criticized some things in certain parts, but they followed the sum of universal confusion; they opened up no use, which was nevertheless the head of the matter. Agricola alone, among so many writers, perceived that use of humanity and taught that logic should be referred to it, but he explained only a part of the art. Most praised Agricola as an excellent logician, but to my knowledge, no one imitated the exercise of Agricola's logic in the whole art. Finally, I fell upon Galen’s book On the Decrees of Hippocrates and Plato; I admired the dialectical decrees; then it was very amazing to me that in the contention for dialectical praise, Galen compared Hippocrates (whom he worshipped like some kind of god) not to Aristotle, whom I had believed to be the inventor and perfecter of this art, but to Plato, as the prince of all philosophers in this art. But yet, I was not so much satisfied by this comparison of Hippocrates and Plato as I was excited to read through all the dialogues of Plato that taught something about Dialectica logic/dialectics. Here, to tell the truth, this was the most wished-for and pleasing port of salvation for me. For from the sermons of Socrates, I perceived that to reason generally is the same as to use human faculty; I recognized the partition of invention and logical disposition. But beyond that (which was the greatest of all), I saw the rule of an artificial methodus method; then I learned various serious and useful precepts concerning the types of arguments in various places. I also greatly approved and loved this in Plato: that Socrates, in refuting false opinions, proposed to himself this one thing above all: to call those whom he disputed against away from the senses of opinions and the testimonies of men, and to lead them to equity of mind and freedom of judgment; because he thought it foolish for philosophers to be moved rashly by the opinions of men, which are mostly fallacious and mendacious, rather than to assent constantly to a thing known and perceived from all its causes. Why say more? I began to think to myself (when it would have been a matter of conscience to another):