P E T R I R A M I

envy

...he was enervating the arts; for this discourse initiated the Aristotelian action. Hence, agitated by the clamors of the Aristotelians, he was transferred to the supreme council of the Parisian court; then, when the matter was conducted in the legitimate manner of judgment and the envy of the most unjust fraud was seen to be perceived more openly, the case was dismissed by the Parisian Senate to Royal cognition, by which, five judges having been appointed—two from each side and the fifth designated by royal nomination—he was ordered to speak his case concerning the individual chapters of the Animadversions. Here, although Ramus had three most hostile judges out of the five, he nevertheless appeared on the appointed day to obey the royal mandate; one scribe was present to record the arguments of Ramus and the opinions of the judges; Ramus could obtain no one as a witness to his defense. For two days, there was contention with great struggle concerning the definition and partition of the art of Dialectica dialectics, which were absent in the books of the logical Organon. On the first day, the three Aristotelian judges judged against all the laws of a well-described art that there was no need for a definition for the perfection of the art of Dialectica. Johannes Quintinus Heduus and Io. Bomontius of Paris, who were the two judges chosen by Ramus, judged for their singular erudition and learning that every disputation which proceeded by way and reason ought to start from a definition, and they signed this in writing. On the following day, the three Aristotelian judges, greatly disturbed, agreed concerning the partition: that the legitimate parts of Dialectica are invention and judgment, and they wrote down their opinions concerning this matter. But when Ramus urged that the Aristotelians were therefore deservedly criticized by him because, having omitted the proper partition, they overwhelmed all of Dialectica in a thousand darknesses, it pleased the three judges to enlarge the case and put it off to another day, because in this way the Aristotelians could not be superior. This was the end of hearing Ramus; for thereafter the Aristotelian judges began to seethe, to quarrel among themselves, and to argue that they had immersed themselves through imprudence from where they could not emerge safe. Therefore, lest Ramus not be condemned, a new plan was entered into, that the whole disputation be unraveled from the beginning, and what had already been judged be rejected and held for nothing. But Ramus refused to do this and began to complain more freely that he had been handed over to these judges to whom it was not enough to oppose his opinion with such blind greed, if they also did not rescind their own, especially when stated and signed, with no shame for their inconsistency. Wherefore, Ramus then appealed from those three accusatory judges, since he could not draw them away from such violence by his own complaint or the admonition of the remaining judges.

Ramus... [unclear] ...

This truly [unclear] worthy of a wise man