Peri ermēneías

in the same, which is the highest antithesis opposition, as it always and perpetually divides the true from the false.

SO THAT the true may be distinguished from the false, the oppositions of enunciations are considered: first, however, the account of antiphatikēs contradictory opposition must be taken, in which the use of that axiom (pan to phanai ē apophanai alēthes it is true for everything to affirm or deny) is clearly seen. And in the preceding chapter, we have summarized the hōs en typō antiphaseis contradictions as in an outline. Here, however, everything must be taught distinctly, and the antitheses oppositions themselves must be compared among themselves, as many as can exist.

Ratio of investigating antitheses.

Before all else, a method for investigating all antitheses must be adopted in this way. Those things about which we speak are true, either as katholou universal, or as kathekasta particular/individual: the former fall under the intellect, the latter under the senses. I call those katholou which can be said of many; kathekasta, those which cannot be said of many. To these, in enunciations, I call the predicate, or that katēgoroumenon thing predicated, what is said about another; and the subject, that about which another is said. And when the subject is a certain katholou noēma universal concept, it is brought forth either infinitely, without any sign, or determinately and limitedly, i.e., with some sign. The signs and diorismoi limiters/determiners signify not the katholou itself, but hōs katholou as universal and hōs en merei as in part/particular: hōs katholou: "every," "no one"; hōs en merei: as "a certain," or "someone," "a certain not," or "someone not," to which these signs are isodynamōsai equivalent: "not none" (that is, "someone"); "not every" (that is, "someone not").

What a predicate is.

What a subject is.

These enunciations are opposed hōs enantiai as contraries: