Peri ermēneías

Opposition of contraries.

Subcontrary.

Third kind of antiphatikē contradictory opposition.

Subaltern opposition.

Opposition of indefinites.

"Every man is just," "no man is just"; but hōs hyperenantiai as subcontraries, "some man is just," "some man is not just." Equivalent to these hyperenantiais subcontraries are: "not-no man is just" (i.e., someone is just), "not every man is just" (i.e., someone is not just). These are the two kinds of opposites.

The third kind is antithesis antiphatikē contradictory opposition, by which universals are opposed to particulars in this way: "Every man is just," "not every man is just" (that is, "some man is not just"). Likewise, "No man is just," "not-no man is just" (that is, "some man is just"). Thus epi tōn kath’ hekasta regarding individuals: "Socrates is just," "Socrates is not just." This opposition must be observed above all, because in all things, through all things, and always, it divides the true from the false.

The fourth kind, called subaltern opposition, the more recent authors have posited, when, the quality of the enunciation remaining the same, the quantity is changed. As when a universal affirmative is opposed to a particular affirmative, and a universal negative to a particular negative. This opposition, however, is not of great use for judging the true and the false. This is regarding determinate enunciations.

Indefinite enunciations by their nature are neither contrary, nor subcontrary, nor contradictory, and as they are indefinite, so also they are opposed indefinitely; sometimes they are also opposed as contraries, sometimes as subcontraries, sometimes even as contradictories. They are opposed as contraries as often as the tade dēlōmena things signified are contrary, as in