Tractatus duo

CAP IIII.

The question of whether the law and reason of friendship conflict with the precept of Charity.

IN the first place, those who feel that these things conflict with one another offer two arguments: of which the first is this, that the precept of God is general, that we should mutually love all others as we love ourselves (Romans 13:8). Because if it is permitted to contract that tight friendship between some, they think that one is already receding from that general rule of loving all equally.

The second is of this kind: that our duties toward all men, even enemies, which are commanded by that precept of charity, ought to be such that no greater or other duties can be performed for those whom we call friends. What, therefore, they say, is the force or effect of this singular and so tight a will, pact, and friendship between any two people? (Matthew 5:34). By these arguments, they think the force of friendship, its consensus, and its custom are destroyed, which, as they say, renders us more negligent in cultivating and helping other men besides our friends: because, content with having helped our friends, we mostly pass by others who are struggling.

But there are other, and most firm, arguments through which the force and custom of friendship is established, and it is understood to be not only permitted to a pious man but also most honest, laudable, and necessary.